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PERVERSE MAIN BANK RESCUE  
IN THE LOST DECADE: 
PROOF THAT UNIQUE INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES 
DRIVE JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Dan W. Puchniak† 
Abstract: Two of the most prominent Japanese corporate governance scholars, 
Professors Miwa and Ramseyer (“M&R”), have recently published numerous articles and 
a book setting out their contrarian free-market theory of Japanese corporate governance. 
According to their theory, contemporary Japanese corporate governance is, and always 
has been, driven by free-market forces and not government incentives.  M&R’s theory is 
enchanting in its simplicity and universality, as it uses standard economic theory to 
provide a single, and seemingly logical, solution to a myriad of complex legal, 
institutional, historical and cultural conundrums that have challenged observers of 
Japanese corporate governance for decades.  Unfortunately, M&R’s theory is also 
incorrect.  This article demonstrates why and by doing so provides evidence against the 
broader convergence theory that looms large in the comparative corporate governance 
literature.   
M&R’s theory fails to explain the systematic lending of trillions of yen by Japanese 
banks to “loser firms,” at below-market interest rates, to rescue them from bankruptcy, 
throughout the lost decade (1990 - 2003).  According to M&R’s free-market theory, 
lending to loser firms at below-market rates is not a rational, optimal, or credible 
governance strategy.  Therefore, to claim that such behavior systematically occurred in 
Japan’s banking system for over a decade would be to create a myth. 
A myth it is not.  Empirical and case study evidence demonstrates that Japanese 
banks did in fact systematically lend trillions of yen to loser firms at below-market 
interest rates to rescue them from bankruptcy.  This paper reveals the matrix of 
institutional incentives that made it a rational strategy for Japanese bank managers to 
engage in such seemingly irrational behavior.  The result is that unique institutional 
incentives, and not universal free-market forces, drove Japanese corporate governance—
which is weighty evidence against the broader corporate governance convergence theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic theories are attractive—especially to academics. When the 
theory is simple, contrarian, and championed by eminent Tokyo University 
and Harvard professors, it is almost irresistible.  However, when it fails to 
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make sense of reality, it quickly loses its appeal.  So, despite the temptation 
to embrace Professor Miwa and Professor Ramseyer’s (“M&R”) new theory 
of Japanese corporate governance,1 that finds decades of research to have 
constructed “a myth,” I resist.2 
The story painted by M&R is enchanting in its simplicity and 
universality.  In their world: 
Whether in the United States or in Japan, firms raise funds in 
competitive capital markets, and buy and sell in competitive 
labor, service, and product markets.  Whether here or there, in 
order to survive, they will need good governance schemes . . . .  
The scheme they pick will vary from firm to firm.  The fact that 
they will pick the optimal scheme or die will not.3 
It all sounds logical, because it is—unless unique and perverse institutional 
incentives, and not free-market forces, drive corporate governance.4  In 
which case, the incentives for “bad governance” and “suboptimal schemes” 
may be greater than those for “good governance” and “optimal schemes.”  
Perverse it is, but mythical it is not.  
The simple fact that taints M&R’s conclusions is that Japan—indeed, 
every country—is unique and that uniqueness matters in corporate 
governance.  Japan’s—again, every country’s—unique institutional 
framework provides incentives that drive the decisions of corporate 
                                           
1
 Professor Milhaupt in a brief review of one of M&R’s earlier articles comments, “M&R will never 
be accused of pursuing a timid research agenda . . . . M&R seek to alter our basic understanding of postwar 
Japanese economic organization and behavior by attempting to prove that the conventional wisdom is flatly 
untrue . . . . M&R have not given us ‘better facts.’ . . . . Rather, they have presented a new theory.”  Curtis 
J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic 
Institutions,  27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425, 425, 435 (2002).  
2
 M&R, in their recent book and articles, claim that the foundational elements of the conventional 
theory of Japanese corporate governance (e.g., main bank system, keiretsu, and lifetime employment) are 
“myths” or “fables” created by imaginative academics.  See generally YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK 
RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU 63-64 (U. Chi. Press, 2006) [hereinafter M&R (2006)]; Yoshiro 
Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance, 
27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002) [hereinafter M&R (2002)]. 
3
 M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 421 (emphasis added).  
4
 In this paper, the term “institutional incentives” refers to incentives that are created by domestic 
laws, regulations, institutions, and formal and informal government policies and practices, which provide 
payoffs for corporate executives to make certain governance decisions.  Institutional incentives are often 
created by governments to achieve a specific political or social agenda and therefore do not always align 
with (and sometimes run counter to) incentives provided by the free-market.  Also, institutional incentives 
are referred to as “perverse” when they provide a payoff for a governance decision that results in, or 
reinforce, economically inefficient behavior.  Institutional incentives are considered “unique” because the 
matrix of domestic laws, regulations, institutions, and formal and informal government policies vary from 
country to country.    
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executives.5  The market in Japan—again, every country’s market—is 
uniquely imperfect in the face of exogenous institutional forces.  In theory, 
economic efficiency guides the “invisible hand” to wash away differences 
between disparate corporate governance systems.  In practice, however, 
institutional forces combine with imperfect markets to create a plethora of 
unique incentives—some of which lead firms to take suboptimal inefficient 
actions that M&R’s theory, which is based on the supremacy of free-market 
forces (as opposed to institutional incentives), would not predict.6  
The reason why M&R’s free-market theory fails, and unique 
institutional incentives matter, is simple.  Hardnosed executives—whether 
downing shots of shochu in Shinjuku or whiskey in Manhattan—do not 
worry about their firms being economically efficient or optimally governed 
in the abstract sense.  Firm survival, and not even profit, is key.7 
What M&R miss in their analysis is that Japanese firms, in their 
unique environment, are often driven by perverse institutional incentives to 
select schemes that may be beneficial to firm survival but may not be 
optimally efficient.8  The consequence of firms responding to such 
incentives and picking suboptimal schemes is not, as M&R predict above, 
that they will die.  While some may die, others may simply get “sick” and 
later be bailed out by the government, while a few others may thrive on the 
perverse incentives.  Whatever the result, one thing holds true: firms will 
adopt inefficient suboptimal schemes when the incentives to do so are 
greater than the incentives for alternative actions. 
                                           
5
 In this paper, “institutional framework” refers to the matrix of laws, regulations, institutions, and 
formal and informal government policies and practices that have an impact on Japanese corporate 
governance. 
6
 Milhaupt’s brief review of one of M&R’s earlier articles supports the view taken in this paper that 
M&R’s theory is based on the supremacy of free-market incentives.  Specifically, Milhaupt characterizes 
M&R’s theory as follows:  “The theory is that Japanese firms exist in a world of perfect market 
competition, a world where informal relationships and institutions of all types, including government 
regulation, are irrelevant in the shadow of the invisible hand and private contracting.”  Milhaupt, supra note 
1, at 436.  This paper builds on Milhaupt’s review by providing numerous examples from M&R’s recent 
works that confirm that, at its core, M&R’s theory is based on the principle that free-market incentives are 
the driving force in post-war Japanese corporate governance—and that institutional incentives had, and 
have, a de minimus effect.  
7
 The motivation for an executive to ensure that their firm survives is that if the firm fails they will 
lose their position and all of the benefits that they derive from it (e.g., salary, reputation, and self-worth). 
The motivation for firm survival is arguably stronger in Japan than in most other countries because the 
economic future of core employees is tied to the firm through lifetime employment and as such the 
executive labor market is inactive. See John O. Haley, Career Employment, Corporate Governance and 
Japanese Exceptionalism (Wash. U. Faculty Working Papers Series, Paper No. 04-04-01, 2004), available 
at http://law.wustl.edu/faculty/workingpapers/haley/ corporategoverance.pdf. 
8
 In this paper, “optimally efficient” refers to the scheme that a firm can select which produces the 
greatest possible economic benefits from its free-market transactions.  In this sense, assuming a perfect 
market, if all firms make “optimally efficient” decisions, the result will be Pareto optimality. 
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This is the perverse story of Japanese banks in the lost decade.9  As a 
result of being mired in nonperforming loans arising from poor lending 
decisions in the 1980s, banks were on the verge of collapse.  Many spent the 
lost decade treading terribly close to having insufficient healthy capital to 
continue banking operations. According to American precedent, unhealthy 
banks tighten lending, causing a “capital crunch.”10  Unhealthy banks 
definitely do not increase loans to risky clients.  American precedent may 
apply to America, but it does not apply to Japan.11 
American precedent and M&R’s theory go hand in hand.  In M&R’s 
world, sophisticated banks with billions of dollars at stake do not spend 
good money after bad—especially when there is little hope of recovering 
part of the bad.12  With limited capital in a competitive market, standard 
economic theory would tell us that banks lend to their best clients (those 
with good governance, who choose optimal schemes and are thus most 
likely to repay loans), not their worst, or they die.  A priori, firms that 
choose suboptimal schemes are deprived of capital and culled from the 
market.  For banks to do the opposite—lend to their worst clients—is not 
rational in a free-market.  Based on M&R’s theory, rational bankers will not 
                                           
9
  For a concise overview of the economic position that Japanese banks found themselves in during 
the lost decade, see generally Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Japan’s Financial Crisis and Economic 
Stagnation, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a)].  There is no single 
definition for the “lost decade.”  However, it is generally considered to be the period of stagnation after the 
bursting of the bubbles in the early 1990s that lasted until the early 2000s. 
10
 A “capital crunch” occurs when banks decrease their lending supply for some lender-specific 
reason.  Many American researchers concluded that a “capital crunch” occurred in the US in the early 
1990s—worsening the recession at that time.  The general consensus is that banks, in particular weaker 
banks, decreased risky lending and purchased government securities to meet the minimum capital 
requirements under the Basel Accord.  See generally Brian J. Hall, How has the Basle Accord Affected 
Bank Portfolios?, 7 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 408 (1993); Joseph G. Haubrich & Paul Wachtel, Capital 
Requirements and Shifts in Commercial Bank Portfolios, FED. RES. BANK CLEV. ECON. REV. 2 (1993).  
11
 According to Peek and Rosengren, “In sharp contrast to the bank capital crunch experience in the 
United States in the early 1990s, when troubled banks quickly shrank their loan portfolios in order to 
increase their capital ratios, domestic bank loans in Japan continued to increase until the mid-1990s.”  Joe 
Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Unnatural Selection:  Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in 
Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1144, 1144 (2005).  This is confirmed by Hosono and Sakuragawa who found 
that “[a]lthough Japanese banks were burdened with huge amounts of nonperforming loans, they did not 
shrink loans outstanding until 1998.”  And after that, “[w]hile Japanese banks shrank their lending to the 
manufacturing sector, the most profitable sector, they increased their lending to the real estate and the 
construction sector, which were suffering from the persistent depreciations in land prices.”  Kaoru Hosono 
& Masaya Sakuragawa, Bad Loans and Accounting Discretion, 8-9 (Presented at the CIRJE-TCER 7th 
Macro Conference Program, Nov. 26, 2005), available at http://fhayashi.fc2web.com/confs/ 
domestic%20macro%2005.htm [hereinafter Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005)]. 
12
 M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 63-64; M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 417; Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Deregulation and Market Response in Contemporary Japan: Administrative Guidance, 
Keiretsu, and Main Banks, 23 (CIRJE Discussion Papers, Paper No. CIRJE-F-267, 2004), available at 
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2004/2004cf267.pdf [hereinafter M&R (2004b)].   
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take such seemingly self-destructive, economically inefficient, actions.13  
Therefore, the best explanation is not that Japanese bankers irrationally took 
such actions but rather that such actions did not occur at all.  To say 
otherwise, would be to create another “myth.” 14 
Yet, in the lost decade, unhealthy Japanese banks did the opposite of 
what American precedent and M&R would predict.  To start, banks lent 
more not less.15 This may seem strange, but does not qualify as perverse.  
What is perverse is that in lending more they increased lending not to their 
clients who were most likely to pay them back but rather to their clients who 
were least likely to pay them back.16  Even more perverse is that they did not 
                                           
13
 In M&R’s words, “The moral is simple:  the main bank does not help the least profitable firms.”  
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter? Japanese Bank-Borrower Ties in 
Good Times and Bad 22 (CIRJE Discussion Papers, Paper No. CIRJE-F-239, 2003), available at 
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2003/2003cf239.pdf [hereinafter M&R (2003)].  See also 
Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies:  The Problem of Bank 
Rescues, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 301, 338 (2005) [hereinafter M&R (2005)].  M&R (2002), supra note 2, 
at 421. 
14
 M&R commonly use the logic that if standard economic theory (i.e., free-market forces and profit 
maximization) cannot explain the alleged actions taken by Japanese firms, the best explanation is not that 
free-market forces do not drive the behavior of Japanese firms, but rather that the alleged action never 
occurred at all.  See M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 418-19; M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147. 
15
 Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1144. Hosono & Sakuragawa similarly find that, following 
the burst of the bubble, although Japanese banks were burdened by an enormous amount of nonperforming 
loans they did not start to shrink their lending until the end of the lost decade and, in fact, increased lending 
to the least profitable sectors (construction and real estate) during that time.  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), 
supra note 11, at 8-9.  These facts dovetail with the surprising finding that, despite deregulation of the 
Japanese bond market, reliance by Japanese firms on bank lending consistently increased throughout the 
lost decade.  In fact, in 2000, Japanese firms received a higher percentage of their debt from banks than in 
1986 – when the bond market was heavily regulated and the main bank system was considered solid. 
However, as with the total amount of bank lending, to fully understand the overall increase in the reliance 
of firms on bank lending, one must consider the behavior of profitable and unprofitable firms separately. 
During the lost decade, the dependence of firms on bank lending in the most profitable sector 
(manufacturing) actually decreased, while the dependence of firms in the least profitable sectors 
significantly increased (construction, real estate and retail). Yasuhiro Arikawa & Hideaki Miyajima, 
Relational Banking in Post Bubble Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN (Masahiko Aoki et al. 
eds., 2006) at 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=818344.  In addition, a recent paper by three leading 
scholars confirms that despite what would normally be expected in the case of an extremely unhealthy 
banking industry the “credit crunch explanation" insufficiently describes what occurred in Japan during the 
lost decade.  Richard J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan, 28-29 
(Working Paper, 2006), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1241. 
16
 See generally Caballero et al., supra note 15; Arikawa & Miyajima, supra note 15; Peek & 
Rosengren, supra note 11; Shin-ichi Fukuda et al., Deteriorating Bank Health and Lending in Japan, 
(CIRJE Discussion Papers, Paper No. CIRJE-F-364, 2005), available at http://www2.e.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~seido/output/Fukuda/Fukuda28.pdf; Bank of Japan , An Assessment of Financial Stability: 
Focusing on the Banking Sector, Financial System Report (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/ronbun/fsr/data/fsr05a.pdf; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11; 
Alan Ahearne & Naoki Shinada, Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan (Presented at  the CGP 
Conference, Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/ 
CGP/Oct2004Papers/Ahearne.pdf; GILLIAN TETT, SAVING THE SUN (2003); Toshitaka Sekine et al., 
Forbearance Lending:  The Case of Japanese Firms, 21:2 Monetary and Economic Studies 69 (2003); 
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charge a premium to their worst clients to compensate for their increased 
risk.17  As path dependence would predict, Japan’s main banks took the lead 
in orchestrating the perverse scheme of systematically lending to loser firms, 
which in essence was “main bank rescue” gone bad.18  Main banks rescuing 
loser firms does not sound like banks practicing, or rewarding corporations 
for, good governance or choosing optimal schemes.  Yet in Japan’s unique 
and perverse institutional environment, rescuing loser firms by lending them 
more at below-market rates made sense.19  
Rescuing loser firms made sense because it ensured survival.  To 
survive, which is the ultimate incentive, banks had to solve two problems: 
(1) to appear to decrease nonperforming loans; and, (2) to appear to have 
enough healthy capital to continue operating.  In Japan’s unique institutional 
environment, lending to their worst customers solved both problems.  It 
made nonperforming loans appear as performing ones and increased the 
appearance of healthy capital.  Therein lie the perverse incentives—which 
do not, any longer, seem so perverse.  That is, if you were a senior executive 
of a Japanese bank during the lost decade. 
Make no mistake.  According to M&R’s theory, “good governance” 
and “optimal schemes” would not include the survival tactics that Japanese 
banks took in the lost decade.  In their world, such behavior would not exist.  
Their assumption is that free-market forces drive Japanese banks to act in 
essentially the same manner as their American counterparts: to choose 
                                                                                                                              
Kaoru Hosono & Masaya Sakuragawa, Soft Budget Problems in Japanese Credit Market (Nagoya City 
University Discussion Papers in Econ. No. 345, 2003), available at http://www.econ.nagoya-
cu.ac.jp/~oikono/dp/pdfdp/dp345.pdf [hereinafter Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003)]; Masaya Sakuragawa, 
KIN’YU KIKI NO KEIZAI BUNSEKI (ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS) (2002); Kotaro Tsuru, 
The Choice of Lending Patterns by Japanese Banks During the 1980s and 1990s (IMES Discussion Paper 
Series, Paper No. 2001-E-8, June 2001), available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/ 
publication/edps/2001/01-E-08.pdf; Takeo Hoshi, Naze Nihon wa Ryudosei no Wana kara 
Nagarerurenainoka? [Why is the Japanese Economy Unable to Get out of a Liquidity Trap] in ZERO KINRI 
TO NIHON KEIZAI (ZERO INTEREST RATE AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY) 233-66 (Mitsushiro Fukao & 
Hiroshi Yoshikawa eds., 2000); Mitsuhiro Fukao, KIN’YU FUKYO NO JISSHO BUNSEKI: KIN’YU SHIJO JOHO 
NI YORU SEISAKU HYOKA (EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL RECESSION) (2000).  
17
 Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 5-12.  See also Sekine et al., supra note 16, at 78; David C. 
Smith, Loans to Japanese Borrowers, 17 J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 283 (2003); Bank of International 
Settlement, 72ND ANNUAL REPORT 133-34 (July 8, 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
arpdf/ar2002e.pdf [hereinafter BIS Report 2002]. 
18
 Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1144-45. 
19
 Nishimura and Kawamoto confirm that, from the perspective of standard economic theory, 
Japanese banks appear to have systematically made non-optimal and non-rational decisions through the lost 
decade.  In their words, “A remarkable feature of Japanese banking problems is the persistence of the 
apparently non-optimal and non-rational behavior of Japanese banks.”  Kiyohiko Nishimura & Yuko 
Kawamoto, Why Does the Problem Persist? 26 WORLD ECON. 301, 302 (2003).  See also Dead Firms 
Walking, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2004, at 77, 77-79 [hereinafter ECONOMIST (2004a)]. 
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economically efficient schemes that maximize profits.20  In their world, “the 
truth about Japan is more logical, more mundane, more boring—and more 
consistent with standard, old-fashioned microeconomic theory.”21  M&R are 
indeed correct in arguing that, according to standard old-fashioned 
microeconomic theory, “most banks in the real world try to cultivate a 
reputation . . . for punishing default debtors [not for rescuing them by 
lending them more].”22  Unfortunately for M&R’s theory, sometimes 
incentives created by a country’s unique institutional framework, and not 
“standard old fashioned microeconomic theory,” explain reality.23 
The point of this paper is not to challenge every specific conclusion 
made in M&R’s recent research.  Indeed, many of the specific conclusions 
are fascinating and, on their face, supported by some statistical evidence. 
However, statistics are only as good as the logic that underlies them. This 
paper calls into question that logic by demonstrating how it fails to predict 
the rescue behaviour of Japanese banks in the lost decade.  In this way, it 
suggests that M&R’s conclusions may mislead.  More importantly, however, 
by demonstrating the fallibility of M&R’s theory, this paper challenges the 
assertion that universal free-market forces play a more significant role than 
unique institutional incentives (i.e. domestic laws, regulations, institutions, 
and the government’s formal and informal policies and practices) in driving 
Japanese corporate governance.  By doing so, this paper hopes to provide 
valuable evidence to counter the growing popularity of convergence 
theory.24  
The balance of this paper will proceed as follows.  There will be a 
brief overview of the conventional main bank rescue theory and an 
                                           
20
 According to M&R, “conventional microtheory with its profit-maximizing firms buying and 
selling in competitive markets does describe Japan.  It always did.  The fables about Japanese bureaucrats, 
keiretsu, main banks, and systematically misgoverned firms are just that—fables.  At root the Japanese 
economy differs little from the American economy (or, we suspect, from any economy anywhere else).  To 
learn about the Japanese economy one does not need Japan-specific accounts of corporate groups, main 
banks, and government-led growth. One does need economics.”  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147. 
21
 M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 421. 
22
 Id. at 417. 
23
 In a brief critique of one of M&R’s earlier articles, Milhaupt reaches a similar conclusion to this 
paper with regards to the shortcomings of M&R’s new theory.  He writes, “‘It takes a theory to beat a 
theory.’  The theory is that Japanese firms exist in a world of perfect market competition, a world where 
informal relationships and institutions of all types, including government regulation, are irrelevant in the 
shadow of the invisible hand and private contracting.”  Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 435-36. 
24
 Some American scholars claim that American corporate governance has finished evolving and that 
economic efficiency will gradually force all other corporate governance systems to converge on the 
American model.  See generally Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” 
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 331 (2001); Ronald Gilson, 
Globalizing Corporate Governance:  Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 331 
(2001); H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). 
20 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
 
 
explanation of why main bank rescue serves as a useful litmus test for 
M&R’s theory (section two).  Then, M&R’s critique of rescue theory will be 
examined to illustrate the logic that underlies much of their recent research 
(section three).  Next, the gap in M&R’s logic will be exposed by 
demonstrating how it fails to predict the perverse rescue behavior of 
Japanese banks in the lost decade.  M&R's failure to acknowledge the 
incentives created by Japan’s unique institutional framework is suggested as 
the main reason their theory fails (section four).  Finally, concluding remarks 
will explain how this narrow analysis of perverse main bank rescue in the 
lost decade may provide useful evidence in the more general corporate 
governance convergence debate (section five). 
II. MAIN BANK RESCUE  
A. A Litmus Test for M&R’s Theory  
Miwa and Ramseyer have labelled the conventional understanding of 
Japanese corporate governance “a myth.”25  To them, the main bank system, 
keiretsu, lifetime employment and a market-manipulating Japanese 
government are nothing more than academic pipedreams.26  Although M&R 
use complex statistics to support their claims, the basic rationale underlying 
most (if not all) of them is simple: contemporary Japanese corporate 
governance can be explained by standard economic theory because it has 
essentially been driven by free-market forces.27  The flipside of the same 
coin is that unique incentives created by Japan’s institutional framework (if 
they exist at all) do not need to be taken into account because they have had 
a de minimus effect on Japanese corporate governance. 
Although M&R’s recent research attempts to debunk all of the major 
elements of the conventional theory of Japanese corporate governance, this 
paper focuses primarily on one: main bank rescue.  The concept of main 
bank rescue provides an excellent litmus test for M&R’s theory for a number 
of reasons.  First, the logic used by M&R to challenge the concept is 
                                           
25
 See generally M&R (2006), supra note 2; M&R (2005), supra note 13; Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Direct Credit? The Loan Market in High-Growth Japan, 13 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 171 
(2004) [hereinafter M&R (2004a)]; M&R (2004b), supra note 12; M&R (2003), supra note 13; M&R 
(2002), supra note 2. 
26
 In M&R’s words, “The claims about the Japanese main bank system are . . . false . . . .Firms and 
workers did not bargain for lifetime employment.  Banks neither promised to rescue defaulting debtors nor 
monitored debtors on behalf of their rivals.  The keiretsu had no substance, and the government had little 
clout.”  M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 420-21. 
27
 M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147. 
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representative of their general approach.28  Second, the concept of main bank 
rescue is of central importance to the conventional theory of Japanese 
corporate governance.29  Third, the extensive empirical research that 
examines the lending behaviour of Japanese banks in the 1990s provides a 
robust tool for testing M&R’s theory.30  
B. A Theory Based on the Importance of Unique Legal and Institutional 
Incentives 
The concept of main bank rescue is rooted in the more general 
Japanese main bank theory.31  According to that theory, Japanese firms 
borrow from many banks but have a special relationship with only one: their 
main bank.  The relationship that firms have with their main bank differs 
from that of other banks in a number of important respects—one of which is 
that main banks make an implicit promise to attempt to rescue failing, but 
potentially productive, client firms when they encounter financial 
adversity.32   
It is important to clarify what the “promise to rescue” entails.  The 
promise made by main banks is to attempt—not to guarantee—to help 
                                           
28
 M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 160. 
29
 For a concise overview of the role that the main bank rescue theory plays in the conventional 
theory of Japanese corporate governance see, Aoki et al.,  The Japanese Main Bank System:  An 
Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 1-50 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 
1994).  
30
 See generally Caballero et al., supra note 15; Arikawa & Miyajima, supra note 16; Peek & 
Rosengren, supra note 11; Fukuda et al., supra note 16; Bank of Japan, supra note 16; Hosono & 
Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11; Ahearne & Shinada, supra note 16; Sekine et al., supra note 16; 
Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16; Sakuragawa, supra note 16; Tsuru, supra note 16; Hoshi, 
supra note 16; Fukao, supra note 16. 
31
 In describing main bank rescue this paper largely draws on the recent works of Aoki because he is 
widely considered the leading scholar in this area and his work is the focus of M&R’s critique of main bank 
rescue theory.  M&R (2002), supra note 2 at 402, 404-05, 421.  See also M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 63-
64; M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 306-07; M&R (2003), supra note 13, at 4-6, 18.  Although there is not 
an agreed upon definition for “main bank rescue”, a majority of scholars use a similar definition in which 
the main bank lends money, resources, and personnel to firms in financial difficulty, and in exchange, the 
firm must hand over some degree of governance power to the main bank and undertake reforms.  See Aoki 
et al., supra note 29, at 25-26; MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 60-94 (2000) [hereinafter Aoki (2000)]; Paul Sheard, Main Banks and the 
Governance of Financial Distress, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 188-230 (Masahiko Aoki & 
Hugh Patrick eds., 1994); Masahiko Aoki, Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An 
Analytical and Developmental View, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 109, 119-21 (Masahiko Aoki 
& Hugh Patrick eds., 1994) [hereinafter Aoki (1994)]; See also TAKEO HOSHI & ANIL KASHYAP, 
CORPORATE FINANCING AND GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE (MIT Press 2001) 
[hereinafter Hoshi & Kashyap (2001)]; Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Corporate Governance and 
Commercial Banking:  A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and, the United States, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 73, 85 (1995). 
32
 See generally Aoki et al., supra note 29; Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 60-94; Sheard, supra note 
31, at 188-230. 
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restructure potentially productive (not all) firms rather than foreclosing on 
its loans in a time of financial crisis.33  The promise is not to provide a carte 
blanche for potentially productive firms to receive unconditional financial 
and managerial assistance in a time of crisis.34  To the contrary, as part of its 
rescue, the main bank “actively intervenes, punishes and displaces 
managers, and sometimes the general work force, and oversees or engineers 
organizational and asset reorganizations” to improve firm productivity.35  To 
this end, after it is determined that the firm’s financial difficulties are only 
temporary, or that restructuring is possible, the main bank may take a 
number of steps, including: (1) providing additional loans; (2) refinancing 
existing main bank debt; (3) guaranteeing the firm’s other debts; and/or (4) 
sending members of the bank to act as managers or directors.36  If, however, 
the main bank’s attempt to make a firm more efficient is thwarted by 
existing management, the main bank will cease its rescue attempt and let the 
firm fail.37 
Main bank rescue is efficient because the economic value of a 
potentially profitable firm as a going concern (with its firm-specific tangible 
and intangible assets) is normally greater than the value of its liquidated 
parts.38  Thus, society as a whole benefits when potentially productive, but 
financially distressed, firms are rescued.39  Efficient rescue prevents valuable 
firm-specific assets from being squandered by premature liquidation and 
avoids the costs associated with the coordination problems, conflicts of 
interest, and strategic behaviour that loom large in formal bankruptcies.40  
However, rescuing a firm is not always beneficial for society.  Society 
suffers when financially distressed firms with no potential for future 
                                           
33
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 71. 
34
 Sheard, supra note 31, at 190; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 123. 
35
 Sheard, supra note 31, at 211.  
36
  Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 71; Aoki et al., supra note 29, at 25-26; Sheard, supra note 31, at 
193; TAKATOSHI ITO, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 116 (MIT Press 1992). 
37
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 71; David Gilo, The Problem of Bank Rescues:  A Comment on 
Miwa and Ramseyer, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 341, 343 (2005).  David Gilo’s article provides an 
interesting brief critique of M&R's argument on the basis that they do not properly consider the fact that in 
many cases  management has an incentive to thwart the attempt of the main bank to rescue. 
38
 Aoki et al., supra note 29, at 18; Sheard, supra note 31, at 190-91.  
39
 In the American system, the court-led bankruptcy system and the market for corporate control are 
seen to play the same role as main bank rescue.  It is argued that in its heyday, main bank monitoring did 
this more effectively than the American system and was a factor that contributed to Japan’s higher growth.  
According to main bank theory, the main bank is in the optimal position to rescue because it does not suffer 
from collective action and information asymmetry problems suffered by creditors, managers, and 
shareholders, and is less costly and has better information than the courts or corporate raiders.  Sheard, 
supra note 31, at 210-11. 
40
 Id. 
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productivity are rescued.  Propping up such firms wastes limited resources 
on preserving firm-specific assets that are of little value. 
The implication for main banks is clear.  To be efficient, they must 
have enough incentive to rescue potentially productive firms but not so 
much incentive that they indiscriminately rescue every firm—which of 
course would include those firms with no potential for productivity.41  
According to the conventional main bank theory, the unique institutional 
environment that existed during Japan’s high growth era (1951 to 1973) 
produced such equilibrium.42   
To create the equilibrium, the government had to provide main banks 
with an incentive to rescue.  As illustrated above, rescue is costly.  Often, the 
costs associated with rescue exceed the losses that a main bank would suffer 
by forfeiting its debts.  Micro-economic theory tells us that in such a 
situation rational bankers will jettison their clients—unwilling to spend good 
money after bad.  This is especially true when the primary lender, such as 
the main bank, has an informational advantage over other lenders, making 
early exit feasible.  Thus, the government had to provide substantial 
institutional rents—which are not provided by the free-market—to give 
banks an incentive to rescue potential profitable firms.43 
The government created institutional rents by tightly controlling 
interest rates, restricting the bond market, and limiting new entrants to the 
banking industry.44  In this unique institutional environment, banks earned 
above-market rents from clients proportional to their share of deposits.  To 
increase deposits, banks sought more branches.  Since the government 
controlled new branches through issuing licences, it created an incentive for 
banks who kept their promise to rescue.45  
There were also many legal and institutional deterrents that the 
government employed to ensure that main banks did not jettison their 
clients.  The government had the power to withhold branch licenses and 
dispatch ex-bureaucrats to banks who failed to fulfil their promise to 
rescue.46  In addition, since the institutional environment made main bank 
rescue the norm, a main bank stood to suffer significant reputational losses 
                                           
41
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 83; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 126-28. 
42
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 88-89; Aoki et al., supra note 29, at 46.  
43
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 86; Aoki et al., supra note 29, at 26-32; Sheard, supra note 31, at 
204-10; Kazuo Ueda, Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks for the Main Bank System, in THE 
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 89 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).  
44
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 87; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 128-29. 
45
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 87; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 129; Aoki et al., supra note 29, 
at 30-32. 
46
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 87; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 129; Aoki et al., supra note 29, 
at 30-32. 
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by letting an inordinate number of firms fail.  Specifically, if a main bank 
developed a reputation for jettisoning financially distressed clients it stood to 
lose depositors (who would question the bank’s ability to manage their 
funds), clients (who would doubt the bank’s commitment to rescue), and 
business with other financial institutions (who may fear entering into a 
financing consortium with a bank prone to adverse selection).47  
In sum, according to the conventional main bank theory, in the high 
growth era, the cost of rescue combined with institutional rents and 
deterrents resulted in an equilibrium where banks had an incentive to rescue 
potentially productive firms.48 Since main banks attempted to rescue 
potentially productive firms ex post, it made their promise to rescue credible 
ex ante.  In addition, the high cost of rescue provided a strong incentive for 
main banks to avoid adverse selection by taking measures to lend to 
productive firms (ex ante monitoring) and by helping existing client firms to 
avoid financial difficulties (interim monitoring).49 
Most conventional main bank theorists suggest that Japan’s 
institutional framework has irreversibly changed since the mid 1970s—
reducing the institutional incentives that motivated main banks to rescue 
potentially productive firms.50  The 1970s and 1980s saw the end of 
regulated interest rates, the phasing out of restrictions on bonds, and the 
globalization of markets.51  This new institutional environment deprived 
main banks of the necessary rents to provide them with an incentive to 
rescue potentially productive firms (ex post monitoring) and to perform their 
other important ex ante and interim monitoring functions.  The breakdown 
of the main bank system (of which efficient rescue was a critical part) is 
suggested by many scholars as a significant factor in the creation of the 
bubbles, their bursts, and the lost decade that followed.52 
                                           
47
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 87; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 129-30. 
48
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 82-89. 
49
 Id., at 79-89. 
50
 Id., at 89-92; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 135-37.  See also Hoshi & Kashyap (2001), supra 
note 31, at 219-66; BAI GAO, JAPAN’S ECONOMIC DILEMMA: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF PROSPERITY 
AND STAGNATION 186 (Cambridge U. Press 2001); Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, The Japanese Banking 
Crisis:  Where Did it Come From and How Will It End? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7250, July 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W7250 [hereinafter Hoshi & Kashyap 
(1999)]. 
51
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 89-90.    
52
 Id., at 89-92. 
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C. Japan’s Unique Institutional Framework Is at the Core of Rescue 
Theory 
A core concept of main bank rescue theory, which cannot be 
overlooked, is the critical role played by Japan’s unique institutional 
framework.  This unique framework provided the incentives that drove the 
decision of banks to rescue potentially productive firms.  Although much has 
been written about main bank rescue, at its core the theory is simple: for 
rescue to occur the incentive to rescue must be greater than the incentive not 
to rescue.  As explained above, due to the high cost of rescue, it only became 
feasible when Japan’s unique institutional framework provided the necessary 
incentives that made it in the best interest of main banks to do so. 
In this sense, rescue theory is built on the notion that quantifiable 
incentives and rational decision making drive corporate governance.  It 
leaves no room for vague notions of main bank managers choosing to rescue 
floundering firms based on some nebulous concept such as samurai culture.  
Most main bank theorists would agree with M&R that it is absurd to think 
that a sophisticated bank would voluntarily rescue a distressed client when 
the cost of rescue is greater than the potentially recoverable debt—that is, if 
it were not for institutional incentives.  Thus, the core difference between the 
conventional main bank rescue theory and M&R's free-market theory is that 
institutional incentives matter in the former but not in the latter.53   
III. M&R’S CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL MAIN BANK RESCUE: PUTTING 
THEIR LOGIC ON DISPLAY 
A. The Logic of M&R’s General Theory  
Strip away the statistics and the thrust of M&R’s recent research 
becomes simple:  free-market forces drive Japanese corporate governance 
and institutional incentives are de minimus.54  The story told is of an 
invisible hand guiding firms through perfect markets that “track[] the 
contours of standard economic theory.”55  As they see it, “in post-war 
Japan . . . firms bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and thrived or failed—
on highly competitive markets.”56  No doubt economists fantasize about 
                                           
53
 In Aoki’s words, “The way the main bank system functioned in the high growth period differs 
from the neo-classical competitive norm built on the assumptions of perfect information and complete 
markets.”  Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 131.  See also Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 86-89. 
54
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147. 
55
  See M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 202. 
56
  M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 30. 
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markets where firms freely compete for capital, banks rationally allow 
failing borrowers to fail, regulations expose banks to market competition, 
and the law flexibly allows firms to move to Pareto optimal governance 
schemes.  Unfortunately, fantasies are not reality—especially those as 
farfetched as perfect markets in Japan.57 
To make their theory plausible, M&R are forced to create a world in 
which Japan’s institutional framework (i.e., laws, regulations, institutions, 
and formal and informal government policies and practices) is irrelevant.  
Create they have. According to M&R, the government has been 
“congenitally unable” to regulate the market.58  Even in cases “where the 
Japanese government tried [its] hardest,” free-market forces hopelessly 
overwhelmed it as firms “flouted” government regulations “all the way to 
the bank.”59   
The rationale used by M&R to explain the government’s inability to 
create an institutional framework that provides meaningful incentives to 
influence corporate behavior varies.  In some instances, they suggest 
incompetence—that the government’s ill-conceived regulations “did not 
bind.”60  In other instances, they suggest a lack of formal and informal 
power—the government “lacked the means” to regulate.61  In still other 
instances, more confusingly, they suggest that the government regulated 
merely for show.  It created regulations it “never seriously tried” to 
enforce,62 or that were “enforced haphazardly, if at all”63 or that were merely 
made “in principle” but allowed for gaping exceptions.64  Ironically, this last 
description of a honne/tatemae government seems more “culturalist” than 
“Chicago School of Economics.”  However, in the end, whether by 
incompetence, inability or face-saving, M&R always find a way to reach the 
same conclusion:  the government had, and presumably still has, “little 
clout”65 in regulating the market and “virtually no say in who invested how 
much in what.”66  In sum, whether Japan’s institutional framework is unique 
                                           
57
  Milhaupt, in a brief critique of one of M&R’s earlier articles, highlights this weakness in M&R’s 
theory.  Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 435-36. 
58
  M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 172. 
59
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 140-41; M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 192-99; M&R (2004b), 
supra note 12, at 17. 
60
  M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 185, 191, 202. 
61
  See id., at 202.  See also M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 127. 
62
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 128; M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 8. 
63
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 127; M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 8. 
64
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 136-37; M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 179. 
65
  See M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 421. 
66
 M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 172.  M&R’s claim that the Japanese government is totally 
ineffective raises a number of obvious questions, with no obvious answers.  What government anywhere, 
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is moot because it had, and has, a de minimus effect on corporate 
governance. 
M&R use their free-market theory as a tool to demonstrate why the 
conventional main bank model is fundamentally flawed.  The manner in 
which they apply their general theory to the specific tenets of the main bank 
model is evident in their attempt to debunk the conventional theory of main 
bank rescue. 
B. M&R’s Free-Market Theory Applied to the Conventional Theory of 
Main Bank Rescue 
Miwa and Ramseyer claim that the conventional theory of main bank 
rescue is a concept created by academics who “ostensibly. . .write [articles] 
to understand the world we live in” but have no basis in reality.67  To M&R, 
rescue theory is flawed from the outset because it runs counter to their 
notion of a post-war Japan that is so easily explained by standard economic 
theory, which is governed by profit maximization, efficiency, and free-
market forces.68  The so-called main bank rents or incentives that the 
government provided to banks to encourage rescues either never existed or 
were ineffective in providing an incentive in the face of free-market forces.69  
They admit that the government may have tried to create such incentives but 
conclude that the free-market determined the actual environment in which 
banks made their decisions.70  
Miwa and Ramseyer use their free-market theory to develop 
numerous specific arguments for why conventional rescue theory is a myth.  
They have four primary arguments:  (1) there normally is little incentive for 
main banks to rescue; (2) rescue only occurs when banks can profit from 
rescue or banks fail to monitor; (3) if there was a promise to rescue it would 
have been made in writing (although it was not); and (4) if rescue were to 
have occurred the banks would not have been the ones to rescue. 
                                                                                                                              
let alone among the world’s most developed economies, is completely ineffective?  Who would want to 
work in such a government?  Why did some of the most talented people in Japan want to do so? 
67
 See M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 401. 
68
 In M&R’s words, “the story of Japan’s economic emergence . . . is a story about competition 
among profit-maximizing firms in decentralized markets.” M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 156. 
69
 See M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 202; M&R (2002), supra note 2 at 421; M&R (2003), supra 
note 13, at 7-8, 22; M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 417.  
70
 M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 202. 
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C. There Is Normally Little Incentive for Main Banks to Rescue 
M&R claim that main banks normally have little incentive to rescue 
because “a bank that sends good money after bad usually loses both.”71  
Further, banks stand to benefit from allowing failing firms to fail because by 
doing so they “cultivate a reputation . . . for punishing default debtors.”72  
Such a reputation decreases adverse selection and moral hazards, which 
maximizes profits.73  
Miwa and Ramseyer ultimately conclude that since rational banks 
normally have little incentive to rescue, they usually do not.  They tell us 
that Japanese bankers act “[l]ike bankers elsewhere”74 and pull their loans 
from failing debtors “before their competitors noticed the trouble.”75  
Obviously, if main banks “do not try to save ex post . . . they cannot 
credibly . . . promise to save ex ante.”76  On this basis, they find the promise 
to rescue to be a “figment of the academic imagination.”77 
Indeed, standard neoclassical economic theory lends some support to 
M&R’s assertion.78  As M&R point out, considering the high cost of rescue, 
“a bank that implicitly agrees to supply such aid potentially faces a 
subgame-imperfect strategy.”79  Rational businesses do not choose such 
strategies—those that do fail.  Obviously, Japan’s multibillion–dollar, 
sophisticated banks normally act rationally.  Thus, the only logical 
conclusion that M&R leave us with is that Japanese banks do not employ 
such subgame-imperfect strategies.  If they did, after all, they would not be 
multibillion-dollar sophisticated banks.  So their argument goes. 
Miwa and Ramseyer’s argument makes perfect sense when the factors 
that are used to determine what is “optimal” are limited to the costs and 
benefits that directly flow from the discrete financial relationship between 
the bank and the failing client firm. However, the theory breaks down when 
                                           
71
  See M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 23. 
72
  M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 417. 
73
  With little to gain and much to lose, M&R also posit that providing money and resources to failing 
firms is in many cases tantamount to charity.  They jest that “at the point of insolvency . . . [t]he firm’s 
employees and shareholders will welcome additional funds [and] enjoy the obvious charity,” but “[t]he 
banks will not.”  M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 339.  
74
  See M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 63-64; M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 338; M&R (2002), supra 
note 2, at 421. 
75
  See M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 63-64; M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 338; M&R (2002), supra 
note 2, at 421. 
76
  M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 309.  
77
  See M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 19. 
78
  This paper does not dispute that M&R’s theory describes a banking industry that “tracks the 
contours of standard economic theory.”  See M&R (2004a), supra note 25, at 202. 
79
  M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 307. 
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one takes a broader perspective and considers the institutional incentives that 
make it in the best interest of main banks to rescue.80  From this perspective, 
the critical question for determining when main bank rescue will occur is, in 
what circumstances do institutional incentives outweigh the discrete 
financial costs of rescue?  
Obviously, to M&R, this question is moot.  According to their theory, 
institutional incentives either do not exist or have a de minimus effect on 
corporate governance.  How could such incentives exist when the very 
institutional framework that purportedly creates them is impotent?  The 
assumption that Japan’s unique institutional framework has a de minimus 
impact on corporate governance is thus the glue that holds M&R’s critique 
of main bank rescue together.   
The importance of M&R’s assumption of the irrelevancy of Japan’s 
unique institutional framework cannot be over emphasized.  Bank rescue is 
only a sub-game imperfect strategy if institutional incentives either do not 
exist or insufficiently compensate main banks for the risk they assume when 
they promise to rescue.  If one assumes that the institutional incentives, 
which main banks receive for rescue, outweigh the costs of rescue, then it is 
in the best interest of banks to rescue (even when they stand to suffer 
financial losses on the discrete bank/firm transaction).  In game-theory lingo, 
the bank’s threat to rescue becomes a credible action—an action that bankers 
will rationally choose.  
D. If Rescue Occurs, It Is Only When Banks Can Profit from Rescue or 
Banks Fail to Monitor 
Miwa and Ramseyer have carefully tailored their critique of main 
bank rescue to explain away considerable case study and anecdotal evidence 
of main bank rescue.81  They dismiss this evidence by suggesting that banks 
everywhere lend default debtors extra funds (or renegotiate bad debts) where 
it will “cut the bank’s losses.”82  The rationale is simple:  sometimes it pays 
                                           
80
  See infra, section two. 
81
  M&R summarize the main bank rescue theory as follows:  “[A]ccording to most Japan ‘experts,’ 
main banks do implicitly agree to rescue borrowers. Typically, the experts claim that the banks rescue by 
lending the firms funds that they otherwise would not lend. Even when the loan is not financially 
advantageous, main banks lend.”  M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 324.  However, M&R claim that despite 
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support it.  M&R argue that the main bank rescue theory is merely supported by anecdotes that “show only 
that some banks sometimes rescue some firms—and that, of course, is beside the point.”  M&R (2003), 
supra note 13, at 18-19.  See also M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 78.  For an extensive case study of 
Japanese main bank rescue, see Sheard, supra note 31, at 188-230. 
82
  “Once a bank faces the prospect of a large loss on an outstanding debt, it often has an incentive to 
lend a bit more (or to cut the interest rate, or to write off a bit of the debt) to nurse the firm back to health.” 
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to gamble.  When faced with the potential of losing their original loan, 
sometimes it makes sense to risk lending more to a failing firm with the 
hope that the firm can be revived and will pay back its debts.  This is 
consistent with M&R’s argument that main banks will only engage in rescue 
when they stand to make profit (or cut losses) from the discrete bank/firm 
transaction—without consideration of institutional incentives.  
Miwa and Ramseyer also attempt to discredit examples of rescue 
where the main bank had no realistic chance of benefiting from the discrete 
bank/firm rescue transaction.  They suggest that sometimes banks, as a result 
of incompetent interim monitoring, do not recognize that a firm is failing.  In 
such a case, they may lend money, not because they have an incentive to do 
so, but rather because of their incompetent monitoring, “it was too late to 
pull their loans.”83  Presumably, main banks that commit this mistake too 
often will fail in Japan’s “highly competitive market.”84  Therefore, main 
bank incompetence would not result in a sustainable equilibrium where the 
promise to rescue becomes the norm.  
Either way, M&R’s conclusion is the same.  Free-market forces, 
devoid of any meaningful influence from institutional incentives, control 
rescue behaviour.  Banks do not choose to rescue because of institutional 
incentives—such incentives either do not exist or are de minimus.  
Microeconomic theory predicts that banks will make every attempt to avoid 
rescue and will only reluctantly rescue when it is a sub-game perfect strategy 
based on the potential of maximizing profits from the discrete bank/firm 
relationship.  
E. If Main Bank Rescue Exists, It Should Be in Writing 
Miwa and Ramseyer claim that if main banks were to promise to 
rescue their clients such agreements would be in writing.85  They suggest 
that since there are no such agreements in writing, the agreements must not 
exist.  The logic they use to explain why such agreements would be in 
                                                                                                                              
M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 417.  “Japanese banks may sometimes bail out troubled firms—but after all, 
here or there, doing so sometimes lets a bank cut its losses ex post.”  M&R (2003), supra note 13, at 25.  
See also M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 78. 
83
  “Try as creditors might to avoid the quandary, sometimes they find that lending a defaulting 
debtor extra funds or renegotiating a debt will cut their losses.  That they sometimes do either does not 
mean they agreed to rescue ex ante.  It may just mean they failed to notice the firm’s travails until it was 
too late to pull their loans.”  M&R (2003), supra note 13, at 19. 
84
  In post-war Japan’s economy, “firms bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and thrived or failed—
on highly competitive markets.”  M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 30. 
85
  “[G]iven all these problems, if banks did negotiate these terms, one would think they at least 
would do what insurance companies do with their own obligations:  draft fine-print contracts about each.”  
M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 23. 
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writing if they existed is that “[g]iven the resulting risks that [banks] will 
renege [on their promise to rescue], rational firms and banks should at least 
negotiate legally enforceable claims” and put these claims in writing.86  After 
all, according to M&R, sophisticated Japanese banks “regularly fell forests” 
to paper other similar transactions, so why leave unwritten what are 
essentially “billion-dollar insurance contracts?”87 
Again, the assumption made by M&R is that banks have no incentives 
to rescue—leading them “to renege.”88  Obviously, if one assumes that 
institutional incentives are insignificant, then written contracts would be 
necessary to force banks to carry out rescue agreements that are not in their 
best interests.  However, assuming institutional incentives make it in the best 
interests of banks to rescue then there is no need for contractual coercion.  
Banks will willingly promise to rescue because it is in their best interest to 
do so.  The risk of banks reneging on their promise becomes de minimus.  
The cost of contracting becomes unnecessary.89 
F. If Rescue Occurs, Banks Would Not Be the Ones to Rescue  
Miwa and Ramseyer claim that if rescue were to occur, other related 
firms (not main banks) with some connection to the failing firm (either a 
partner or firm in the same industry) would be the rescuer.90  To M&R, 
simple economic theory suggests that related firms can perform rescue more 
efficiently than main banks.  This is because related firms “would know 
better than bankers how to revamp the firm.”91  They could use valuable 
industry specific knowledge and skills to more efficiently guide the 
restructuring process.  Banks do not possess such knowledge or skills, and it 
would be costly, if not impossible, for banks to acquire them. 
This may be the case, in a perfect market.  However, due to the path 
dependent nature of economic development in post-war Japan, banks, and 
                                           
86
  M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 64; M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 307. 
87
  M&R (2002), supra note 2, at 416-17. 
88
  See M&R (2004b), supra note 12, at 23. 
89
  M&R’s written contract argument also lacks persuasive logic. According to M&R’s theory, when 
it is in the best interest of main banks to rescue (i.e. when the economic incentives in the discrete firm/bank 
transaction outweighed the costs), they rescue.  M&R’s conclusive claim that the promise to rescue does 
not exist is more accurately a claim that there is no incentive for main banks to rescue.  In this sense, 
M&R’s written contract argument is tautological:  (1) because main banks have no incentive to rescue, the 
contract must be in writing; and (2) because it is not in writing, main banks must have no incentive to 
rescue. 
90
  “By simple logic, if any entity were to ‘rescue’ a firm, it would not be a bank.”  M&R (2005), 
supra note 13, at 338. 
91
 See id.  
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not firms, have been at the center of the governance model.92  For better or 
worse, banks receive institutional rents for rescue, not related firms.  Thus, 
related firms would not have the necessary incentives to commit to rescue.  
At the risk of being monotonous, M&R’s logic once again assumes that 
Japan’s unique institutional framework does not provide any significant 
incentives for banks to rescue.  The free-market is the only significant factor 
driving corporate governance.  Take away this assumption, and the logic that 
related firms and not banks should rescue is flawed.   
IV. PERVERSE MAIN BANK RESCUE IN THE LOST DECADE—PROOF 
INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES MATTER  
A. The Lost Decade:  A Robust Litmus Test for M&R’s Free-Market 
Theory 
The dramatic burst of Japan’s stock and real estate bubbles in the early 
1990s, followed by over a decade of economic malaise, was one of the major 
economic events of the twentieth century.  The main bank system, which is 
often seen as a crucial component in the meteoric rise of Japan’s post-war 
economy, has been the focus of many economists who try to explain Japan’s 
sudden economic collapse in the early 1990s and prolonged stagnation that 
lasted until the early 2000s.  The volume and sophistication of the literature 
analyzing the role played by Japan’s banking system, in what has been 
dubbed “the lost decade,” is impressive.93  Numerous studies use 
econometrics to provide a clear picture of how bank-lending practices 
contributed to the economic stagnation during this period.94  These studies 
provide a robust litmus test for M&R’s free-market theory. 
                                           
92
  Path dependence theory suggests that the conditions existing at the time when an institution is 
formed will influence its functioning far into the future.  As applied to the evolution of a country’s system 
of corporate governance, the theory posits that the forces of economic efficiency are limited by each 
country’s particular legal, institutional, political, and historical “starting points”—which existed when the 
system of corporate governance first emerged.  In Japan, many commentators see the institutional 
framework that developed immediately following the war as the “starting point” for the contemporary 
system of corporate governance.  See Gilson, supra note 24, at 334; TETT, supra note 16, at 59; Dan W. 
Puchniak, The 2002 Reform of the Management of Large Corporations in Japan: A Race to Somewhere?, 
5:1 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 42, 70-71 (2003). 
93
  There is no single definition for the “lost decade.”  However, it is generally considered to be the 
period of stagnation after the bursting of the bubbles in the early 1990s that lasted until the early 2000s. 
94
  See generally Caballero et al., supra note 15; Arikawa & Miyajima, supra note 15; Peek & 
Rosengren, supra note 11; Fukuda et al., supra note 16; Bank of Japan, supra note 16; Hosono & 
Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11; Ahearne & Shinada, supra note 16; Sekine et al., supra note 16; 
Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16; Sakuragawa, supra note 16; Tsuru, supra note 16; Hoshi, 
supra note 16; Fukao, supra note 16.  
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At first blush, looking to the lost decade for evidence of main bank 
rescue may appear to be misguided. Indeed, following market liberalization 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the general consensus is that there was significant 
erosion of the main bank system and, in turn, the promise to rescue.95  As a 
result, the literature examining the relevance of the main bank system in 
Japanese corporate governance, M&R included, normally focuses on the 
high growth era, and in many cases explicitly avoids the lost decade.96  
This paper departs from the normal approach for the following 
reasons.  First, as will be illustrated below, main bank rescue played as 
fundamental a role in prolonging Japan’s recession during the lost decade as 
it did in propelling its growth during the high growth era.  In this sense, the 
lost decade provides weighty evidence of the importance of main bank 
rescue—and by inference, Japan’s unique institutional framework—in 
shaping Japanese corporate governance.  Second, M&R do not limit their 
free-market theory to a particular sub-period in post-war Japan, or even post-
Meji Restoration.  They claim that free-market forces, and not Japan’s 
unique institutional framework, are responsible for the evolution of modern 
Japanese corporate governance.97  Therefore, their theory, if accurate, should 
explain the actions taken by main banks during the lost decade.  Indeed, 
M&R boldly claim in their recently published book that their explanation of 
how free-market forces drove the evolution of Japanese corporate 
governance post-Meji Restoration will give the reader “the tools and 
instincts with which to analyze what went wrong” during the lost decade.98  
Third, other academics, such as Aoki, have already skilfully examined the 
relevance of main bank rescue in the high-growth era—one more article is 
unlikely to resolve the “he said, she said” debate sparked by M&R’s recent 
research. 
                                           
95
 Aoki (2000), supra note 31, at 89-92; Aoki (1994), supra note 31, at 135-37; Aoki et al., supra 
note 29, at 30-32.  See also Hoshi & Kashyap (1999), supra note 50, at 4; GAO, supra note 50, at 186. 
96
  See M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 67, 84; M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 316. 
97
  See M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147.  Specifically, with regard to M&R’s view of pre-war 
Japanese corporate governance, see M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 38-60. 
98
  Id., at 4.  Interestingly, M&R spend less than fifteen pages in their recently published book, The 
Fable of the Keiretsu, explaining how their free-market theory explains the lost decade. Perhaps, this is 
because to them it is obvious—the answer is the same as the answer that one arrives at after analyzing any 
period in Post-Meji Restoration Japan:  free market force determined Japanese corporate governance.  It is 
also interesting that M&R fail to comment on the extensive body of literature that has found that banks 
systematically lent to losers during the lost decade. Regardless of the reasons for this, it makes the 
application of this “new evidence” to M&R’s theory worthwhile.  See M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 147-
60. 
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B. Rescuing Loser Firms:  An Empirical Reality That Eludes M&R’s 
Free-Market Theory 
Apply M&R’s free-market theory to bank lending during the lost 
decade and the story told is a fairytale of neoclassical economics in practice.  
Japanese banks were motivated to maximize profits.  As such, they withdrew 
credit from less profitable, poorly performing firms which were hurt by the 
collapse of the bubbles, and reallocated it to more profitable, well 
performing firms.  By doing so, the banks pressured poorly performing firms 
to adjust to changing market conditions or shut down.  As a result, in the 
face of the dramatic asset devaluation, efficient banks did what they could to 
maximize profits and at the same time efficiently reallocated capital 
throughout the economy.  Inefficient banks, which did not take such profit-
maximizing actions, were culled from the market and the firms they 
supported died. In the end, creative destruction occurred in banking and 
industry, credit was efficiently reallocated and the economy swiftly adjusted 
to continued growth.99  
Like any fairytale, this one, based on M&R’s free-market theory, 
remains a wishful fantasy.  What should have been a fairytale of creative 
destruction was a long drawn-out recession punctuated by a banking 
nightmare.  What should have been a banking crisis that was resolved in four 
years (when compared with other similar banking crises) lasted for well over 
a decade.100  What should have been a period of rampant creative destruction 
in a speculative banking industry (similar to what occurred in the US savings 
and loan and 1990s Nordic banking crises) was instead a period where the 
banking industry maintained its asset value.101  The bill for the Japanese 
                                           
99
  This description of how M&R’s free-market theory would explain bank lending in the lost decade 
is consistent with the manner in which M&R describe firm performance in the lost decade.  According to 
M&R, “the facts suggests a much more mundane tale:  the best firms grew rapidly in the booming 1980s 
and weathered the troubled 1990s; the worst firms grew only haphazardly in the 1980s, and floundered 
badly in the 1990s.”  M&R (2003), supra note 13, at 24. 
100
 In the 1990s, both Finland and Sweden went through more serious asset market collapses than 
Japan.  Korean markets were also hit hard by the Asian currency crisis.  In each case, like in Japan, the 
respective countries’ banking systems had to deal with eroded healthy capital and massive amounts of non-
performing loans.  All of the countries resolved the fundamental problems in their banking systems in less 
than four years.  This is consistent with comparative banking crisis research, which finds that the average 
banking crisis lasts for 3.9 years.  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 2.  See also Time to 
Arise from the Great Slump, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2006, at 71, 71 [hereinafter Economist 2006]; Michael 
Hutchison et al., Empirical Determinants of Banking Crisis: Japan’s Experience in International 
Perspective, in WHY DID JAPAN STUMBLE? 157, 176 (Craig Freedmon ed., 1999); Michael Hutchison & 
Kathleen McDill, Are All Banking Crises Alike? The Japanese Experience in International Comparison 13 
J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 155, 156 (1999). 
101
 Japanese domestic banking assets shrunk by less than 1 percent between December 1993 and 
December 2003—a stark contrast to the asset shrinkage that occurred in the US savings and loan industry 
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taxpayer, that should have been much less than the bill for American 
taxpayers to resolve their banking crisis after the relatively more severe 
Great Depression, ended up being for twice as much.102  What should have 
been a decade where nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) were written off was a 
decade that saw NPLs balloon.103  It is clear that all of the things that 
“should have happened,” according to M&R’s free-market theory, did not.104  
When economists became tired of examining the “should haves” and began 
examining reality, the institutional framework that was maintaining Japan’s 
uniquely costly and prolonged recession came into focus. 
As the 1990s ended, it became increasingly clear that the bursting of 
the bubbles and economic stagnation that followed had not affected all 
industries equally.  Industries such as real estate and construction—which 
expanded rapidly during the 1980s and relied heavily on the value of land—
suffered far more during the lost decade than other industries such as 
manufacturing.105  The significant losses suffered by hard hit industries made 
bank loans to these troubled industries more risky and less profitable.106  The 
                                                                                                                              
which shrunk by 43 percent between 1988 and 1993, the Finnish domestic banking system which shrunk by 
33 percent between 1991 and 1995, and the Swedish domestic banking system which shrunk by 11 percent 
between 1991 and 1993.  Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Solutions to Japan’s Banking Problems: What 
Might Work and What Definitely Will Fail 23 (Aug. 27, 2004) (draft manuscript, presented at the US-Japan 
Conference on the Solutions for the Japanese Economy, June 2004), available at 
http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/workshop/ 040903/040903Kashyap.pdf [hereinafter Hoshi & Kashyap (2004b)]. 
102
  During the lost decade, Japan’s worst annual growth rate was minus 2 percent, whereas during the 
Great Depression, the United States suffered a negative growth rate of more than 6 percent in each year 
between 1930 and 1932.  By inference, one would expect that the banking crisis in the United States during 
the Great Depression was much more severe than the one in Japan during the lost decade.  The opposite is 
true.  During the Great Depression, the total amount lost by bank depositors was 2.2 percent of GDP, 
whereas the cost to Japanese taxpayers of their banking crisis was 4 percent of GDP.  The Japanese 
government injected more than 10 trillion yen into the banking system with relatively little success. Hoshi 
and Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 4-6. 
103
  Astonishingly, over the course of the lost decade NPLs in Japan actually increased—despite 
massive injections of capital from the government. Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 29. 
104
  According to the Economist, increased lending by Japanese banks to failing firms “has proved one 
of the most durable, distorting and deliberate compacts in modern economic history.  It has set Japan apart 
from other countries stricken with financial crisis and greatly prolonged its economic suffering . . . during 
financial crises elsewhere bankers typically stop lending to unviable borrowers.”  ECONOMIST (2004a), 
supra note 19, at 77-78.  See also Nishimura & Kawamoto, supra note 19, at 302.  
105
  Ahearne & Shinada, supra note 16, at 3-4.  See also Hosono and Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 
11, at 9. 
106
  According to Hosono and Sakuragawa, one way to measure the risk and profitability of loans is to 
examine the average period in an industry that a bank can expect its loan to be repaid.  “This measure 
captures the borrowers’ insolvency and is supposed to be negatively related to the profitability of loans. 
The estimated years of debt repayment increased sharply in the early 1990s for real estate and commerce, 
and in the middle of the 1990s for construction.  They reached as high as 36 years and 14 years for real 
estate and construction, respectively, on average over the 1990s.  This insolvency measure increased 
slightly for manufacturing in the 1990s but the average remained as low as 9 years.  The upward trend in 
the estimated years of debt repayment reflects the fact that the sharp decline in land prices reduced the loan 
profitability to real estate, commerce and construction.”  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 
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obvious question that arose was whether Japanese banks were efficiently 
reallocating credit away from less profitable industries and towards the more 
profitable ones—as M&R’s free-market theory would predict.  The short 
answer is no.  In fact, the opposite is true—they were systematically 
rescuing failing firms. 
In the 1990s, Japanese banks increased lending to their clients that 
were least likely to pay them back and decreased lending to their clients that 
were most likely to pay them back.107  Even more surprisingly, they did not 
charge a higher interest rate to their worst clients to compensate for 
increased risk.108  As path dependence would predict, Japan’s main banks 
took the lead in orchestrating the perverse scheme of systematically lending 
to loser firms.109  Since M&R’s free-market theory explicitly rejects the 
possibility that Japan’s unique institutional framework drives the lending 
decisions of bank managers, one is left with the absurd conclusion that, for 
over a decade, Japanese bank managers systematically chose to irrationally 
“spend good money after bad” to support unprofitable firms.  Perhaps the 
shots of shochu in Shinjuku were different from the shots of whiskey in 
Manhattan after all.  
Shochu aside, this paper suggests a more rational theory based on a 
wealth of empirical research.  Japanese bank managers rationally decided to 
lend to their worst clients because Japan’s unique institutional framework 
gave them an incentive to do so.  However, before describing the unique 
institutional framework that drove Japanese bank managers, it is necessary 
to examine the empirical research that confirms that banks did in fact 
systematically engage in “lending to losers.” 
C. Overwhelming Empirical Evidence Indicates That Banks 
Systematically Lent to Losers 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence that during the lost decade 
Japanese banks systematically lent to inefficient and unprofitable firms.110  
                                                                                                                              
1.  In another article Hosono and Sakuragawa note, “This shift in bank loan portfolios is inconsistent with 
the behavior of profit-motivated banks, suggesting that Japanese banks continued to extend loans to 
unprofitable firms and industries even though it was unlikely that those loans would be recovered.”  
Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 9. 
107
 Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1144, 1162-64; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 
11, at 8-9; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 1-2. 
108
  Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 5-12.  See also Smith, supra note 17; Sekine et al., supra note 
16, at 78; BIS Report 2002, supra note 17, at 133-34.  
109
  For empirical evidence that the main bank system played a central role in the systematic lending 
by banks to losers firms throughout the lost decade, see Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11. 
110
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11 at 1164-65.  See generally Caballero et al., supra note 15; 
Arikawa & Miyajima, supra note 15; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11; Fukuda et al., supra note 16; Bank 
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More importantly, the evidence is clear that institutional incentives 
motivated the decision to lend to losers—not profit maximization.111  There 
are four findings that have been repeatedly confirmed by a sophisticated 
body of empirical research that support this conclusion: (1) banks 
disproportionately increased lending to unprofitable industries; (2) banks 
disproportionately increased lending to firms with lower profit rates and 
poor stock returns; (3) the future performance of firms that received 
additional loans was worse than average; and (4) banks increased lending to 
firms at below-market interest rates. 
D. Banks Increased Lending to Unprofitable Industries 
In 2000, Hoshi published the first paper suggesting that banks were 
systematically lending to losers during the lost decade.112  His research, 
which is based on industry level data, found that during the lost decade the 
loan share of banks increased to the least profitable industries (such as real 
estate and construction) and decreased to the most profitable industries (such 
as manufacturing).113  Numerous studies, which also rely on industry level 
data, have confirmed Hoshi’s general findings.114  
Research based on industry level data, while convincing, is not 
foolproof.  Such research may obscure an important reality of bank 
lending—that it takes place at the firm, and not industry, level. It is easy to 
see how one could put a “free-market spin” on these empirical findings by 
suggesting that industry level data may reveal the strategic decision of banks 
to focus their lending on profitable firms in undervalued industry—not to 
                                                                                                                              
of Japan, supra note 16; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11; Ahearne & Shinada, supra note 16; 
Sekine et al., supra note 16; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16; Sakuragawa, supra note 16; 
Tsuru, supra note 16; Hoshi, supra note 16; Fukao, supra note 16.  For a concise overview of the recent 
empirical research in this area, see Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 14-15; Hoshi and Kashyap 
(2004b), supra note 101, at 4-7.  
111
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16.  Hosono and Sakuragawa conclude, based on their 
empirical analysis of Japanese bank lending in the lost decade, that “Japanese banks seem to have extended 
bad loans to real estate-related industries for any other motive than profit-maximization over the 1990s.”  
Id., at 19. 
112
  Hoshi, supra note 16, at 233-66. 
113
  Id.  Specifically, Hoshi found that bank loans to real estate developers continued to grow in the 
1990s, long after the profitability of the industry had dramatically declined because of the bursting of the 
real estate bubble—while at the same time loans to firms in the more profitable manufacturing industry 
steadily declined.  Hoshi suggests that the reason for the increased loans to poorly performing real estate 
companies was so that they could pay the interest on the loans so that they would not be classified as non-
performing.  Id.  
114
  Fukao, supra note 16; Sakuragawa, supra note 16, at 99-126; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), 
supra note 16; Tsuru, supra note 16.  Interestingly, a recent study done by the Bank of Japan, which uses 
industry level data, suggests that evergreening from banks continued to escalate from the time of the bursts 
in 1990 until 2001, at which time it appears to have started to subside.  Bank of Japan, supra note 16, at 30.  
38 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
 
 
intentionally lend to losers.  However, research using firm level data fails to 
support this free-market conclusion.  
E. Banks Increased Lending to Less Profitable Firms with Lower Stock 
Returns  
Firm level data confirms that banks systematically lent to losers 
throughout the lost decade.  In 2005, Peek and Rosengren published what is 
arguably the most systematic study to date on the misallocation of bank 
credit during the lost decade.115  Their study uses firm-level data to show 
that firms with low profit rates and poor stock returns were more likely to 
receive additional loans from banks during the lost decade.116  The clear 
implication is that banks were systematically choosing to lend to 
unprofitable firms rather than strategically picking profitable firms in 
undervalued industries.  Other studies, which also use firm level data, have 
confirmed Peek and Rosengren’s general conclusion.117 
Admittedly, if one tries hard enough, it is possible to stretch M&R’s 
free-market theory even to make sense out of the findings based on firm-
level data.  It is conceivable that rational bankers, motivated by profits, used 
their informational advantage to “cherry pick” undervalued firms with a high 
potential for future profits.  In Japan’s recessionary economy, it is plausible 
that bank managers facing depressed profits and fewer lending prospects 
opted to lend to poorly performing firms as a last ditch strategy to increase 
profits by extracting above-market interest rates from undervalued firms.  
Arguably, main banks would have been in the ideal position to cherry pick 
because of their informational advantage.  The cherry picking story is 
appealing, but it is also unsupported by empirical research.118 
If banks were using their informational advantage to cherry pick, then 
during the lost decade those firms that received additional loans should have 
subsequently outperformed firms that did not receive additional loans. In 
fact, the opposite is true.  Peek and Rosengren find that the future 
                                           
115
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11. 
116
 Id. at 1149, 1154. 
117
  Caballero et al., supra note 15.  A study done by Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap uses industry and 
firm-level data to show that the percentage of zombie firms (firms that are kept alive by subsidized credit 
from banks) hovered between 5 and 15 percent until 1993 and then rose sharply over the mid 1990s so that 
the zombie percentage was above 25 percent for every year after 1994 until their study concluded in 2002.  
They also found that zombie firms increased in the late 1990s in every industry and the increase was the 
largest in non-manufacturing firms (which were the least profitable firms).  Ahearne & Shinada, supra note 
16.  Research done by Ahearne and Shinada shows, using firm-level data, that during the lost decade 
inefficient firms—which were being sustained in large part by financial support from Japanese banks—
gained market share in inefficient industries.  See also Sekine et al., supra note 16, at 78. 
118
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1148-50. 
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performance of firms that received additional loans was worse than those 
that did not receive additional loans.119  Further, during the lost decade, 
despite the severe problems faced by Japan’s banking sector, firms 
unexpectedly increased their reliance on banking loans relative to bonds.  If 
the story of cherry picking were true, one would expect those firms that were 
“picked” by banks from the bond market would outperform other 
bondholders.  Again, the opposite is true.  Firms that were picked by banks 
were less profitable than those that stayed in the bond market.120    
F. Banks Lent at Discount Rates to Risky Firms 
The interest rate paid by Japanese firms during the lost decade 
confirms that the motivation for lending to losers was not profit-
maximization.  According to standard economic theory, rational banks 
should have charged higher interest rates to less profitable firms to 
compensate for the increased risk of default.  Indeed, if Japanese banks had 
charged an above-market interest rate to compensate for the increased risk of 
their new stable of unprofitable borrowers it may suggest a profit-
maximizing motive.  However, once again there is no empirical evidence 
that finds support for such a strategy.121  During the lost decade, banks 
increasingly charged below-market interest rates to risky firms.122  
G. Case Study Evidence Confirms the Reality of Banks Lending to Losers 
As convincing as the empirical evidence is, it is no substitute for case 
study evidence which confirms the reality that banks, without regard for 
profits, systematically lent to losers.  Tett documents numerous cases of such 
behavior.123  Particularly compelling are the cases reviewed by Tett where 
                                           
119
  Id. 
120
  Id. 
121
 In fact, the empirical research suggests that the opposite strategy was employed—weaker firms 
were subsidized by the banks by being charged below market interest rates.  Caballero et al., supra note 15 
at 5-12.  See also Smith, supra note 17; Sekine et al., supra note 16, at 78; BIS Report 2002, supra note 17, 
at 133-34. 
122
  Smith, supra note 17.  During the lost decade, the number of firms receiving loans at below 
market interest rates increased. Specifically, Smith finds that during the lost decade Japanese banks in 
Japan charged lower (risk adjusted) spreads when compared with foreign banks in Japan to Japanese 
businesses—suggesting that Japanese banks were subsidizing loser Japanese firms.  Caballero et al., supra 
note 15.  Caballero et al. also find that the percentage of firms that received direct interest rate subsides 
from banks increased dramatically during the lost decade.  More importantly, the subsides were far more 
common in non-manufacturing firms when compared to manufacturing firms—further evidence of banks 
using below-market interest rates to support loser firms and industries.  See also Hosono & Sakuragawa 
(2005), supra note 11, at 9; Hoshi and Kashyap (2004b), supra note 101, at 5-6; Sekine et al., supra note 
16, at 78.; BIS Report 2002, supra note 17, at 133-34. 
123
  Tett, supra note 16. 
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firms were forced to open their books for inspection as a result of 
bankruptcy.  An example of such a case involved Sogo, one of Japan’s most 
prestigious retailers, which officially declared bankruptcy in 2000.124  
The story of Sogo is a classic tale of a loser firm which, but for bank 
lending, would have closed its doors years prior to its official bankruptcy.  In 
Sogo’s case, sales growth turned negative in 1992 and continued a steady 
steep decline for almost a decade until it closed.125  According to M&R’s 
free-market theory, Sogo’s lenders should have pulled their loans “like 
bankers everywhere else” and jettisoned the fledgling retailer soon after it 
began its trend of declining yearly sales and mounting losses.126  In fact, the 
opposite happened.  
As Sogo’s finances deteriorated, banks considerably increased 
lending.127  Overall, seventy-three banks decided to continue to pour 
valuable capital down the Sogo drain right up until the moment it officially 
declared bankruptcy.128  Interestingly, the lenders with the largest exposure 
to Sogo—those that presumably had the most accurate information about 
Sogo’s finances—increased their share of Sogo’s debts as its finances 
plummeted.129  This is a far cry from the story that M&R’s theory would 
predict of a profit driven bank acting rationally in the free-market to exploit 
its informational advantage and cut its losses. 
When Sogo finally declared bankruptcy in March 2000, it wrote off 
fifty-nine percent of its assets and owed creditors 1.9 trillion yen.130  It is 
unfathomable, especially in the last few years, that the coalition of seventy-
two banks and IBJ (Sogo’s main bank that held close to thirty percent of its 
debt) actually believed that they were making loans that would eventually 
reap profits or even cut losses.131  Preventing Sogo’s bankruptcy—not 
maximizing profits or cutting losses—was the motive for lending. 
Lending to Sogo may have continued until today if it were not for a 
few idiosyncratic forces that altered the lending relationship between Sogo 
                                           
124
  For an overview of the Sogo case, see id. at 208-20. 
125
  For statistical data relating to Sogo’s sales and loans during the lost decade, see Peek & 
Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1146-47. 
126
 M&R (2006), supra note 2, at 63-64.  See also M&R (2005), supra note 13, at 338; M&R (2002), 
supra note 2, at 421. 
127
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1147. 
128
 Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 14.  See also Tett, supra note 16, at 208. 
129
  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 14.  
130
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1147; Tett, supra note 16, at 208. 
131
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11.  According to Peek and Rosengren: “it is hard to believe that 
these banks thought that they were making positive net present value loans to Sogo over all these years.”  
Id., at 1147.  Tett also concludes that banks knew they were evergreening: “by 1999 it was clear the retailer 
could never repay its debts.”  Tett, supra note 16, at 209. 
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and its creditors.  In fiscal 1999, new accounting rules changed the 
institutional framework that protected Sogo from disclosing its inefficiencies 
and forced it to reveal its substantial negative net worth.132  This made IBJ 
scramble to orchestrate a debt forgiveness agreement among Sogo’s 
creditors to ensure that it did not go bankrupt.133 IBJ’s plan likely would 
have succeeded if it had not been for foreign-owned Shinsei bank refusing to 
accept it.134  
Even after the forgiveness plan failed, Sogo still had the chance to 
stave off bankruptcy through government assistance.135  However, Sogo’s 
fate was sealed because political pressures on the government would not 
allow it to orchestrate a standard bailout.  Much of Sogo’s debt had already 
been passed onto taxpayers through an unpopular deal that the government 
had entered into with the American investors who bought Shinsei Bank, so 
the political repercussions of throwing yet more money at Sogo would have 
been severe.136  In the end, and somewhat ironically, it appears that the 
feared loss of political capital, not economic capital, was what brought Sogo 
down—after almost a decade of banks lending “good money after bad” to a 
loser firm. 
Some may claim that the Sogo case is atypical because of Sogo’s 
enormous debt, the involvement of a foreign controlled bank, and the unique 
political drama.  Although each case is obviously unique, the accounts of 
numerous other Sogos in the literature and the empirical evidence described 
above demonstrate that Sogo was not an aberration.  It was the norm.137  
As shown above, it is possible to stretch M&R’s free-market theory to 
make sense out of some of the empirical research and perhaps even a few 
case studies.  However, M&R’s free-market theory is ill equipped to provide 
a workable explanation for the evidence as a whole.  In light of the weight of 
                                           
132
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1147. 
133
 Id.; Tett, supra note 16, at 208-09. 
134
  Tett, supra note 16, at 208-20. 
135
 Id., at 209.  Indeed, as Tett notes, the government had attempted to do everything it could to bail 
out Sogo in the past: “when the FSA had conducted its audit of the LTCB loans in early 1999, it labeled the 
Sogo loans as almost normal.  Ripplewoood subsequently challenged the classification but the FSA refused 
to reassess the loans.  Instead, the bureaucrats quietly agreed to give the bank an extra Y100 billion of 
provisions to keep the Sogo loans on its books.  This made a mockery of the FSA's own rules, since ‘near 
normal’ loans were not supposed to need such a high level of provisions.”  Id.  
136
  Id., at 208-20; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1147. 
137
 Tett, supra note 16, at 58-59.  This is consistent with the empirical research presented above and a 
number of other related findings.  For example, Tett notes that surprisingly few firms went bankrupt 
following the bursts of the bubbles.  See also ECONOMIST (2004a), supra note 19, at 77-78, which tells the 
story of how banks have kept Daiei (formerly a leader in Japan’s retailer industry) alive more out of 
concern for making Daiei appear like a healthy borrower than actually making it become a profitable 
business.  The Daiei saga is strikingly similar to that of Sogo.   
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the evidence, even M&R may be bashful to conclude that since lending to 
losers does not accord with free-market theory, the best explanation is that 
lending to losers did not happen at all.  The fact is it did happen. The unique 
institutional framework that made it happen is explained below. 
H. The Institutional Framework in the Lost Decade: the Incentives That 
Drove Main Banks to Rescue 
During the lost decade an institutional framework emerged that 
provided incentives that drove banks to systematically lend to losers.  Under 
this institutional framework, profit-maximization and efficiency took a back 
seat to bank managers motivated by survival to keep banks open and, more 
importantly, ensure their lifetime employment at all costs.  Indeed, normally 
making a profit is the best way to ensure firm survival—that is unless a firm 
does not have a realistic chance of actually making a profit, in which case 
appearing to make a profit is the next best option.  
There are several ways that a firm can go about creating the false 
perception that it is making a profit.  However, most methods are either 
criminal or short-term strategies, at best.  For Japanese banks, to decide that 
creating the appearance of profits was a viable long-term strategy, when 
trillions of yen were at stake, sounds more like an act of hara-kiri than a 
rational management strategy.  Unless of course, there was government help.  
And help, the government did.  
Luckily for the fledgling banks, the Japanese government had political 
motives that aligned with their survival agenda.  The government was in no 
position to see large inefficient banks and/or unprofitable firms go under on 
a grand scale.138  Thus, political realities, not economics, drove the creation 
of an institutional framework that allowed banks to select lending to losers 
as a viable long-term strategy (in many cases, the only strategy) for survival.  
                                           
138
  Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 2.  The difficult position that the government has been in 
following the bursts is exemplified by their persistent attempts to deny that the banking crisis existed and to 
delay making any substantial reforms.  As Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap note: “the political and 
regulatory response was to deny the existence of any problems and delay any serious reforms or 
restructuring of the banks.  Aside from a couple of crisis periods when regulators were forced to recognize 
a few insolvencies and temporarily nationalize the offending banks, the banks were surprisingly 
unconstrained by regulators.”  The authors also note that, “in 1997, at least 5 years after the problem of 
non-performing loans was recognized, the Ministry of Finance was insisting that no public money would be 
needed to assist banks.  In February 1999 then Vice Minister of International Finance, Eisuke Sakakibara, 
was quoted as saying that the Japanese banking problem ‘would be over within a matter of weeks.’  As late 
as 2002, the Financial Services Agency claimed that Japanese banks were well capitalized and no more 
public money would be necessary.”  Id.  See also, Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11; Tett, supra note 16, at 
68-69. 
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In retrospect, three watershed events sparked the emergence of the perverse, 
institutionally driven equilibrium of lending to losers in the lost decade. 
First, in the early 1990s, the bubbles burst.139  The collapse of the real 
estate and stock markets significantly eroded healthy bank capital.  Losses 
were magnified by the fact that Japanese banks, in contrast to their American 
and English counterparts, relied extensively on real estate to collateralize 
loans and held significant stock portfolios.140  The battered stock markets 
also made it extremely difficult for banks to issue equities to raise much 
needed new capital.  This shifted the focus of bank managers from 
expanding market share to retrenching and ensuring bank survival.   
Second, in fiscal 1992, the risk-based capital standards based on the 
1988 Basel Capital Accord (“the Basel Accord”) came into force.141 The 
Basel Accord required that Risk-Based Capital, the ratio of capital to risk 
weighted assets (“the RBC ratio”) held by Japanese banks not fall below a 
certain level.142  Although there are no explicit penalties in the Basel Accord 
for falling below the RBC ratio, achieving the hurdle was viewed as a must 
for banks.143  Failing to achieve the hurdle can result in the Financial 
Services Agency (“FSA”) taking control of the bank, international regulators 
curtailing overseas operations, and market discipline.144   The incentive for a 
                                           
139
  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 5-6; Tett, supra note 16, at 62-63; Passing Go, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2004, at 73 [hereinafter Economist 2004b].  From 1990 to 1991, asset prices declined 
rapidly in Japan.  The Nikkei 225 stock price index reached its 38,915 peak on the last business day of 
1989 and then collapsed.  By October 1, 1990, the Nikkei hovered barely above 20,000—a decline of 
almost 50 percent in 9 months.  It then floated around the 15,000 level for the balance of the 1990s—with 
some considerable fluctuations.  The Nikkei entered the new millennium with a brief climb up to 20,000 
and then plummeted again to its post-war low of 7,607 on April 28, 2003—which was less than 20 percent 
of its bubble peak.  Most observers consider 2003 as the end of the lost decade.  Since that time, a recovery 
has been in progress.  At the time of writing this paper, the Nikkei stands around 15,000.  Land prices 
began to fall in late 1991, and by 1995 prices were half of their peak values.  They continued to fall for 15 
straight years until 2005.  At the time of writing this paper, it appears that land prices are slowly starting to 
climb.  Hutchison et al., supra note 100, at 157; Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a) supra note 9, at 5; Economist 
2006, supra note 100, at 72-73; Economist 2004b.  From 1990 to 1991, asset prices declined rapidly in 
Japan. 
140
  Tett, supra note 16, at 62. 
141
  Though the Basel Accord was agreed upon in 1988, the capital standards became effective in 
Japan from fiscal year 1992—after a five-year transition period.  Heather Montgomery, The Effect of the 
Basel Accord on Bank Portfolios in Japan, 19 J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 24, 25 (2005).  See also Takatoshi 
Ito & Yuri Sasaki, Impacts of the Basle Capital Standard on Japanese Banks’ Behavior, 16 J. JAPANESE 
INT’L ECON. 372, 373 (2002). 
142
 Montgomery, supra note 141, at 25; Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 373-74. 
143
 Wako Watanabe, Does a Large Loss of Bank Capital Cause Evergreening? Evidence from Japan, 
3 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf06watanabe.pdf [hereinafter Watanabe 2006a]; 
Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 3-4; Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 373-74. 
144
  At the end of fiscal 1997, the Ministry of Finance (“the MOF”) formalized the consequences of 
failing to meet the minimum RBC ratio by implementing the prudential policy guidelines for prompt 
corrective action (“PCA”), which allows regulators (then MOF and now the FSA) to intervene in banks 
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Japanese bank manager to avoid such consequences is clear: ensure the bank 
meets the minimum capital requirement or lose lifetime employment.145 
Third, as the decade progressed and Japan’s NPL problem 
materialized, market participants began to regard ratios of NPLs of Japanese 
banks as an important indicator of bank health.146  Banks that failed to keep 
NPLs in check were quickly punished by an increasingly skeptical market 
and seen as prime candidates for mergers or FSA intervention.147  For bank 
managers, this meant that keeping the NPL ratio down was as important as 
meeting the minimum RBC ratio; the objective had to take priority over all 
others including profits. 
Considered together, the incentives for Japanese bank managers in the 
lost decade were straightforward: remain solvent, stay above the minimum 
RBC ratio, and keep NPLs down or lose their jobs.  However, exactly how 
bank managers were to achieve these objectives proved to be more complex.  
Bank managers were not making their decisions in a game theory 
model played out in a Tokyo University or Harvard laboratory.  They had to 
pragmatically determine which actions would have the highest chance of 
achieving their objectives based on the implementation of the Basel Accord, 
Japan’s unique regulatory and accounting practices, institutional pressures, 
and bank finances.  What complicated the decision for bank managers even 
more was that, in many cases, actually achieving their objectives was 
extremely unlikely and, in some cases, virtually impossible.148  With an 
institutional framework that facilitated and encouraged creating the façade of 
profitability, it became rational for bank managers to aim for the more 
attainable objective of appearing to achieve their objectives rather than the 
unlikely possibility of actually achieving them.  Indeed, the payoff of 
continued lifetime employment for bank managers was the same for both. 
As the empirical evidence described above suggests, the optimal 
strategy for most Japanese bank managers was to continue to lend to loser 
                                                                                                                              
with an RBC ratio below the minimum 8 percent (4 percent in the case of banks that were not 
internationally active).  Watanabe 2006a, supra note 143, at 3; Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 373-74. 
145
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 3-4.  As Hosono and Sakuragawa note: “The 
Basel capital standards strengthened the tendency for managers to roll over bad loans because they could 
stay as managers only by disclosing the capital ratio above the minimum level of 8%.”  Id.  See also 
Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 4. 
146
 Fukuda, et al., supra note 16, at 7. See generally Tett, supra note 16. 
147
 Fukuda, et al., supra note 16, at 7.  See generally Tett, supra note 16. 
148
 Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 16-18.  This is confirmed by Hoshi and Kashyap’s 
recent research that found that, after adjusting for various gimmicks used to artificially inflate bank capital 
“almost no private capital remain[ed] in the banking sector.”  Id., at 16.  They further found that at the end 
of the lost decade, private sector analysts were “unanimously of the view that the banks [were] bankrupt 
and that the losses for the taxpayers [would] be substantial.”  Id., at 18.  See also Peek & Rosengren, supra 
note 11, at 1144-45. 
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firms to keep them from defaulting on their loans—a practice referred to as 
“evergreening.”149  By systematically practicing evergreening, bank 
managers achieved all of their objectives.  This is because in Japan’s unique 
institutional environment evergreening made it appear to outsiders as if 
banks were: (1) solvent; (2) had RBC ratios above the minimum 
requirement; and (3) were keeping their NPLs in check.  The balance of this 
section will explain how Japan’s unique institutional framework ensured that 
evergreening bank managers would achieve these results.  
I. Japan’s Unique “Enforcement” of the Basel Accord—An Incentive to 
Evergreen 
As mentioned above, in fiscal 1992, the Basel Accord went into force 
in Japan.150  Internationally, the objective of the Basel Accord was to 
standardize capital requirements for banks around the world in order to make 
the international banking system more resilient to adverse market shocks.151  
From the standpoint of Japanese banks, the timing of the Basel Accord 
coming into force in Japan could not have been worse.  Meeting the 
minimum capital requirements set out in the Basel Accord appeared easily 
attainable at the time Japan entered into the accord—before the stock market 
bubble burst.152  Post-burst, the story was very different and the Japanese 
government and banks were forced to “cooperate” and devise a scheme to 
make it appear as if the minimum capital requirements in the Basel Accord 
were being met by Japanese banks.  To understand the effect of the Basel 
Accord and the response to it from the Japanese government and banks calls 
for some elementary mathematics.  
The primary requirement of the Basel Accord is that banks in member 
states must maintain a certain amount of healthy capital in proportion to 
their risky assets—which is called the RBC ratio.153  The Basel Accord 
                                           
149
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 2-6; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 
11, at 8-9; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11. 
150
 Montgomery, supra note 141, at 25. 
151
 Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 373.  
152
  On July 11, 1988, when the final agreement of the Basel Accord was signed, Japan was 
approaching the peak of its stock market bubble.  Japanese negotiators successfully argued that since 
Japanese banks held large amounts of long-term cross shareholdings, which were not meant to be traded, 
they should be able to include a portion of the capital gains on those stocks as part of the regulatory capital 
that was needed to satisfy the Basel Accord’s minimum capital requirement.  When stocks plummeted, by 
more then 50 percent within 9 months of the burst, it dramatically decreased the regulatory capital of 
Japanese banks and made it difficult for many of them to meet the minimum requirements.  Ito & Sasaki, 
supra note 141, at 374. 
153
 Montgomery, supra note 141, at 25; Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 373-74. 
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defines the RBC ratio as capital divided by risk weighted assets.154  The 
Basel Accord requires internationally active Japanese banks to maintain an 
RBC ratio of at least eight percent.155 
Capital, the numerator of the RBC ratio, consists of tier I (or core) 
capital and tier II (or supplementary) capital.156  Tier I capital is composed of 
stock issues and disclosed reserves, including share premiums and retained 
earnings.157  Tier II capital is composed of undisclosed reserves, including 
unrealized capital gains on securities, provisions for general loan losses and 
subordinate debt with maturities exceeding five years.  Tier II capital cannot 
exceed tier I capital in its contribution to total capital.158  
Risk-weighted assets, the denominator of the RBC ratio, is composed 
of bank assets, which are weighted according to their degree of risk.  Risky 
assets such as loans receive a 100 percent weighting and riskless assets such 
as government bonds receive a zero percent weighting.  Secured loans, 
which are seen as moderately risky, “fall in between with a weighting of 
fifty percent.”159 
Arithmetically, the choice that bank managers have to increase the 
RBC ratio is limited.  They can either increase capital (the numerator) by 
issuing new equities, subordinate debts, or preferred stock; or by increasing 
general loan loss reserves; or they can decrease risk-weighted assets (the 
denominator) by reducing heavily weighted assets such as loans or equity 
holdings and substituting them with safe assets such as government bonds.160 
The rationale for compelling banks to meet the RBC ratio is to force 
banks, especially weak banks, to decrease their overall risk so that they can 
more easily withstand market shocks.  The drafters of the Basel Accord 
believed that the RBC ratio would achieve this by compelling banks with 
low RBC ratios to increase tier I and II capital and/or decrease risky assets.  
Indeed, banks around the world have largely acted as the drafters of the 
Basel Accord intended.161 
                                           
154
  For a brief overview of the requirements of the Basel Accord in the context of bank lending in the 
lost decade see, Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11; Montgomery, supra note 141. 
155
  Banks that are not internationally active are allowed, under the Accord, to maintain an RBC ratio 
of at least 4 percent. Montgomery, supra note 141, at 25. 
156
 Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 6. 
157
  Id. 
158
  Id. 
159
  Montgomery, supra note 141, at 25. 
160
  It is important to distinguish between the effect of adding to general loan loss reserves, which 
increases capital, and specific loan loss reserves, which decreases capital.  Specific loan loss reserves are 
treated similar to write-offs, which create an incentive for banks facing a capital shortage to under-allocate 
for them. 
161
  David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and 
Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING FIN. 35, 36 (2000). 
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In fact, if anything, history has shown that the RBC ratio has worked 
too well in making banks stable and instead, in some cases, has made them 
risk adverse.162  Normally, it is difficult and costly for weak banks to raise 
new capital (the numerator in the RBC ratio).  As such, weak banks that are 
at risk of falling below the RBC ratio have resorted to shifting assets from 
loans (100 percent weighted) to riskless assets such as government bonds  
(0 percent weighted)—thereby decreasing the denominator of the RBC 
ratio—while at the same time cutting commercial lending.163  In the early 
1990s, when the United States was in the midst of a recession, many blamed 
the RBC ratio for driving banks to indiscriminately cut commercial lending 
causing a phenomenon that became known as a “capital crunch.”164  The 
“capital crunch” in the United States, during the early 1990s, is suggested by 
many academics as a major factor in the deepening of the recession in the 
United States at that time.165  Even considering American critiques, the 
conventional wisdom is that the RBC ratio drives banks to decrease risk—if 
anything too much. 
However, during Japan’s lost decade, bank managers did not respond 
as the drafters of the Basel Accord, American precedent, or M&R’s free-
market theory would predict.166  Japanese banks found themselves in the 
unique position where government regulations and incentives, coupled with 
their battered balance sheets, made evergreening, rather than cutting risky 
                                           
162
 Id.;  Wako Watanabe, Prudential Regulation and the “Credit Crunch, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY J. 
OF MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 4 (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.econ.tohoku.ac.jp/ 
~watanabe/credit_crunch_wp_032206.pdf [hereinafter Watanabe 2006b]. 
163
 Watanabe 2006b, supra note 162, at 4.  (“Theoretical works have shown that asymmetric 
information—involving investors, a bank, and borrowers—makes issuing new equity costly. Therefore, 
undercapitalized banks failing to satisfy the regulatory minimum may raise the (risk based) capital to asset 
ratio by cutting back on lending (a denominator of the ratio) rather than raising equity capital (a numerator 
of the ratio) in order to immediately clear the regulatory hurdle. The easiest way to raise the risk-based 
capital to asset ratio is to shift the asset portfolio away from lending that is assigned the highest risk weight 
of all asset classes (100% risk weight) to assets with less weight, such as the government bonds of OECD 
countries (0% risk weight)”).  See also Jones, supra note 161, at 36.  
164
  See generally Hall, supra note 10; Haubrich & Wachtel, supra note 10.   
165
 See generally Hall, supra note 10; Haubrich & Wachtel, supra note 10.   
166
  Hall, supra note 10; Haubrich & Wachtel, supra note 10; Economist (2004a), supra note 19.  It 
should be noted, that the issue of whether there was a capital crunch in Japan during the lost decade is 
unsettled.  There are a few studies that have found that there may have been a capital crunch at some period 
during the lost decade, which could have been caused by the Basel Accord.  The strongest evidence for a 
capital crunch is in the years following the 1997 banking crisis.  However, the vast majority of these studies 
suggest that even if there was a capital crunch, for a period of time during the lost decade, that evergreening 
still likely occurred.  In other words, the two conclusions are not mutually exclusive.  Firms obviously can 
lend less overall but still misallocate the credit they do lend to loser firms by continuing to advance them 
funds to make interest payments.  The evidence against a capital crunch (especially in the period from 1991 
to 1997) is much stronger and is the view taken in this paper.  See Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, 
at  6-7; Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 28; Montgomery, supra note 141, at 35; Watanabe 2006b, supra 
note 162, at 23-24. 
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loans, a more effective strategy for meeting the RBC ratio.167  Conveniently, 
this strategy also meant that NPLs would not be reported—an effective way 
of keeping the NPL ratio down.  
From an accounting perspective, it is easy to explain how 
evergreening creates the façade that a bank is meeting its RBC ratio.  When 
a poorly performing firm is unable to pay the interest on its loan for a certain 
length of time (three months since March 1998, and six months previously) 
the loan becomes non-performing.168  The NPL first appears on a bank’s 
financial records as a loan loss reserve (a liability contra-asset account) on a 
bank’s balance sheet before being written off.  If the bank’s income is low 
and/or the level of NPLs is high, its loan loss reserve charge may exceed its 
income.  This requires the bank to reduce its book capital.169  During the lost 
decade, as banks suffered from massive amounts of NPLs and low incomes, 
when a bank wanted to call in its NPLs it normally had to write off existing 
capital, which in turn pushed the bank up against the minimum RBC ratio 
requirement.170  
In theory, to avoid this result is simple.  Before a poorly performing 
firm’s loan becomes non-performing, the bank can evergreen by lending the 
                                           
167
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 3-6.  Hosono and Sakuragawa find that: “The 
theoretical literature on bank regulation argues that capital requirements should discipline bank managers to 
take safer and more profitable loan portfolios that accord more with the interest of shareholders.  The 
practice in Japan was at odds with this theoretical prediction. The Basel capital standards, together with the 
discretionary accounting practice, do not seem to have worked effectively in disciplining a bank’s 
behaviour. As a matter of fact, Japanese regulatory authorities seemed to make every effort to let banks, 
especially major banks, keep capital adequacy requirements by manipulating regulatory frameworks and 
accounting standards.”  Id., at 3.  See also Don't Feed the Zombies, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2006, at 58, 
58 (“[Japanese] banks were throwing good money after bad in this way because twisted regulations made it 
simpler to prop up weak borrowers than cut them off”). 
168
 Patricia Jackson & David Lodge, Fair Value Accounting, Capital Standards, Expected Loss 
Provisioning, and Financial Stability, Bank of England Financial Stability Review 105, 111 (June 2000), 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2000/fsr08art5.pdf.  During most of the lost 
decade, the Japanese definition for NPLs was much narrower than the international standard.  Prior to 
Financial Year (FY) 1995, the definition for NPLs included only loans to bankrupt companies and loans 
past due for six months or more.  In FY1995, the definition was broadened slightly to include restructured 
loans (but only those where the interest rate was reduced to below the Bank of Japan’s discount rate).  In 
FY1997, the definition was broadened again to include loans past due more than three months and all 
restructured loans.  However, this definition did not include loans where, even though no payment 
problems had occurred, the bank had serious doubts about the ability of the borrower to fulfill its future 
obligations—allowing evergreened loans to continue to be excluded from the definition of NPLs.  In 
FY1998, the FSA finally introduced a more comprehensive regime for identifying NPLs that more closely 
reflected international accounting standards.  However, even under this new definition many independent 
observers believe that the level of NPLs remained grossly underreported throughout the lost decade.  See 
Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 15-16. 
169
  Kathryn L. Dewenter and Alan C. Hess, Are Relationship and Transactional Banks Different?, 
EFMA 2004 Basel Meetings Paper, Nov. 25, 2003, at 12-13, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=478101. 
170
  Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
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firm enough funds to pay the interest on its loan.  This kills two birds with 
one stone—it keeps the loan “performing” and the reported RBC ratio from 
falling.171  During the lost decade, Japan’s ultra-low interest rates made this a 
relatively inexpensive strategy.172 
Regardless of how low interest rates are, evergreening is a Ponzi 
scheme that free-market forces normally rout out.173  As poorly performing 
firms continue to underperform they require more bank loans to both 
continue their inefficient operations and cover their interest payments, 
causing risky assets (the denominator in the RBC ratio) to increase.  At the 
same time, evergreening banks are deprived of real interest income, which 
eventually will cause capital (the numerator in the RBC ratio) to fall.  When 
the market becomes aware of evergreening, raising new capital becomes 
next to impossible and bank-financing charges rise, which further impairs 
capital.  Thus, under normal free-market conditions, which M&R’s theory 
assumes, evergreening is not a viable option because it merely delays capital 
erosion in the short-term and ultimately inflates capital losses when market-
forces compel disclosure or drives the firm to bankruptcy—that is, without 
government help. 
During the lost decade, the Japanese government created an 
institutional framework that allowed banks with significant NPLs and 
insufficient healthy capital to use evergreening as a long-term strategy.174  
The government ensured that free-market forces would not come to bear on 
evergreening banks by creating a matrix of laws, regulations, policies, and 
direct government funding to maintain evergreening and the façade that it 
helped create.  The institutional framework neutralized market-forces by: (1) 
artificially inflating bank capital by creating and sanctioning accounting 
gimmicks; (2) preventing disclosure of evergreening by implementing a 
forbearance regulatory policy; (3) ensuring bank management that 
                                           
171
  Sekine et al., supra note 16, at 71 (summarizing the findings of Sakuragawa’s research as follows: 
“a bank, under an opaque accounting system, has an incentive to disguise its true balance sheet so as to 
satisfy the Basel minimum capital requirement.  In this case, a bank without sufficient loan-loss 
provisioning tries to put off disposal of NPLs to avoid decreasing its own capital in an accounting sense”). 
172
  Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 6-7.  It should be noted that evergreening did not always take 
place simply by extending loans to cover interest payments.  There were various methods that were used to 
subsidize loser firms by restructuring their loans, such as: interest rate concessions, debt-equity swaps, debt 
forgiveness, and moratoriums on loan principle and interest.  Restructuring helped banks meet the 
minimum capital requirement because “without such restructuring, banks would be forced to classify the 
loans to those borrowers as ‘at risk’, which usually would require the banks to set aside 70 percent of the 
loan value as loan loss reserves.  With restructuring, the banks need only move the loans to the ‘special 
attention’ category, which requires reserves of at most 15%.”  Id.  
173
  Dewenter and Hess, supra note 169, at 13.  
174
  Peek and Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1144-45; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 
2-6; Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
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evergreening would not result in bankruptcy; and (4) providing capital at 
below-market interest rates. 
This seems like a lot of effort for a government to maintain a façade—
it was. But for the government, the political incentives loomed large.  With a 
mushrooming budget deficit175 and a voting public that was weary of 
funding bank bailouts and were fearful of increasing unemployment, the 
government could ill afford the political fallout of major banks or large loser 
firms failing on a grand scale.176  Thus, political motives, which seldom 
“track the contours of standard economic theory,” drove the creation of the 
instructional framework that supported evergreening.177  
J. Government Accounting Gimmicks Facilitated Evergreening 
During the lost decade, the government created and sanctioned 
numerous accounting gimmicks that prevented free-market forces from 
disciplining evergreening banks.178  Accounting regulations were 
implemented to artificially inflate banks’ regulatory capital, which made it 
possible for banks to carry on evergreening as a long-term, as opposed to 
short-term, strategy.179  The most effective government orchestrated 
accounting gimmicks were: (1) to manipulate fair-value and historical-cost 
accounting standards to suit market fluctuations; (2) to allow double gearing 
with insurance companies; and (3) to permit massive amounts of deferred 
taxes to count as capital.  
                                           
175
  The Viagra Economy, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005, at 12 (“With growth weak and prices 
falling, tax revenues plunged. For the past ten years the budget deficit has been running at an average of 6 
percent of GDP, and Japan's levels of government debt are now by far the highest of any rich country”).  
See also Tett, supra note 16, at xxiv; Chronic Sickness, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 2001, at 73. 
176
  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11.  According to Peek and Rosengren: “Although banks have an 
incentive to evergreen loans, their ability to pursue such policies aggressively requires government 
complicity.  The government faced with a growing budget deficit and a voting public weary of funding 
bank bailouts, has an incentive to allow, or even encourage banks to continue their policies of forbearance 
in order to avoid the alternative scenario of massive firm and perhaps bank failures and, in particular, the 
associated costs both financially and politically.”  Id., at 1145.  See also Mitsuhiro Fukao, Financial Sector 
Profitability and Double Gearing 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9368, 2002), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9368; Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 2-3. 
177
 As described above, M&R’s theory tells the story of an invisible hand guiding firms through 
perfect markets that “tracks the contours of standard economic theory.”  See M&R (2004a), supra note 25, 
at 202.  Interestingly, Hoshi and Kashyap conclude that the sectors that have the most evergreening have 
the strongest political protection, which makes perfect sense considering that evergreening is ultimately 
driven by political motives.  Hoshi and Kashyap (2004b), supra note 101, at 6.  See also Hosono & 
Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 3. 
178
  For a detailed examination of the interaction between accounting regulations and evergreening 
see, Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11. 
179
 Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 3. 
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The historical account of how the Japanese government manipulated 
fair-value and historical-cost accounting standards to inflate banks’ 
regulatory capital is laughable.  The government’s manipulation started in 
the early 1990s, when the stock market bubble collapsed but stock prices 
were still relatively high.  At this time, the government determined that the 
best way to help banks increase their capital was to allow them to apply fair-
value accounting standards to their securities (i.e. to take advantage of the 
rise in stock values) which produced large latent capital gains.  Such 
manipulation would have had no effect on the regulatory capital of banks in 
most other countries because latent capital gains are generally prohibited 
from being counted as part of regulatory capital.180  Despite this, in 1991, the 
Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) allowed Japanese banks to include forty-five 
percent of their latent capital gains generated from the application of fair-
value accounting to be included as part of tier II regulatory capital.  And so, 
just like that, the regulatory capital of Japanese banks ballooned overnight. 
Real capital and banking risk, of course, was left unchanged.  
Then, in 1997, when stock prices dropped sharply, and fair-value 
accounting no longer resulted in inflated regulatory capital, the MOF 
reversed its position.  Now, conveniently for Japanese banks, the MOF 
allowed historical-cost accounting to be used so that the value of stocks 
could be counted at their acquisition price.  This allowed the banks to avoid 
the unrealized capital losses that would have decreased their regulatory 
capital.181  To add to the façade, at the very same time, the MOF allowed 
banks to use fair-market accounting to value land. Predictably, this resulted 
in increasing banks’ regulatory capital because most banks acquired a large 
proportion of their land long before it appreciated in the late 1980s.182  The 
result was that large unrealized capital gains from land holdings could be 
included in tier II capital.  Again, overnight-reported regulatory capital 
ballooned.  And again, such gimmicks left the actual capital and stability of 
evergreening banks unchanged. 
Another accounting gimmick that was allowed by the government to 
help protect evergreening banks from market-forces by artificially inflating 
regulatory capital, was “double gearing.”183  In the most popular form of 
                                           
180
  For example, in the United Kingdom and United States, banks are prohibited from including 
capital gains in regulatory capital.  Ito & Sasaki, supra note 141, at 374. 
181
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 7. 
182
  Id. 
183
 Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 18-19; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, 
at 6-7.  For a more detailed overview of double gearing during the lost decade see, Hanh B. Tran, Double 
Gearing Between Japanese Banks and Insurance Companies, ELECTRONIC J. CONTEMP. JAPANESE STUD.] 
(2006), http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2006/Tran.html;  Fukao, supra note 176. 
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double gearing, banks issued subordinate debt184 (which increases tier II 
capital) to keiretsu-affiliated life insurance companies.  This allowed the 
banks to raise cash and then use that cash to buy subordinate debt issued by 
the life insurance companies, so that the life insurance companies could then 
buy the subordinate debt in the first place.185  To the credit of Japanese 
banks, they mastered the twisted art of double gearing during the lost decade 
and, in the process, created trillions of yen of bogus capital.186 
Is double gearing an accepted international practice?  Of course not.  
The international norm is that domestic regulators prohibit double gearing.187  
The international financial community criticized Japanese regulators when 
the practice of double gearing was eventually revealed.188  Despite this, in 
2000, when Chiyoda Life failed and Tokai Bank lost seventy-four billion 
yen, the FSA actively encouraged double gearing.  Curiously, Shokichi 
Takagi, the Director of FSA’s Supervision Department, publicly stated that 
double gearing among financial institutions is highly beneficial to enhance 
public confidence—but this statement about double gearing only makes 
sense after a double shot of shochu.189  
In 1999, a year after a few Japanese banks collapsed, regulators 
desperately scrambled to devise yet another plan to maintain the façade that 
the banking system was healthy in order to ensure that evergreening 
continued.  The new gimmick was to count deferred taxes (i.e. tax credits 
from past losses that the bank expected to claim in the future) as tier I 
capital.  This was a boon for evergreening banks because, once again, it 
caused artificially inflated regulatory capital to balloon.  
According to Japanese tax law, deferred taxes expire five years after 
losses are incurred.  This means that if poorly performing banks do not 
become profitable the deferred taxes are worthless.  As capital is supposed to 
serve as a buffer for unexpected losses, it does not make sense—aside from 
artificially inflating regulatory capital—to count deferred taxes as part of 
regulatory capital because they are useless precisely when the buffer is 
needed.190  For this reason, in the United States, regulators limit deferred tax 
assets to ten percent of tier I capital. However, and somewhat predictably, in 
                                           
184
  Subordinate debt is, in case of bank insolvency, senior to equity but junior to any other debt 
including other bonds and insured deposits and counts as tier 2 capital. 
185
 Hoshi & Kashyap (2004b), supra note 101, at 3. 
186
  In March 2001, as the lost decade was in its last few years, life insurance companies held 10.5 
trillion yen of subordinated debt issued by banks, while banks held 2.0 trillion yen of subordinated debt 
issued by life insurance companies.  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 19. 
187
  Id. 
188
  BIS Report 2002, supra note 17, at 135. 
189
  Fukao, supra note 176, at 2-3.  
190
  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 15. See also BIS Report 2002, supra note 17, at 133. 
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Japan there was no such limit.  In March 2003, deferred taxes accounted for 
a whopping forty percent of Japanese banks’ book value capital.191  
The net result of government-sanctioned accounting gimmicks is that 
during the lost decade, banks’ RBC ratios considerably diverged from actual 
capital ratios.192  Several sources confirm that as the lost decade progressed, 
years of accounting gimmicks caused actual bank capital to be a mere 
fraction of the reported regulatory capital.193  A striking example can be seen 
in the reported RBC ratios of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Long-Term 
Credit Bank of Japan in 1997.  At that time, both banks had reported RBC 
ratios above the minimum eight percent.  Two years later, both banks were 
bankrupt.194  The government’s ability to artificially inflate the RBC ratios of 
banks allowed evergreening to continue unchecked.  In this sense, 
evergreening was driven by Japan’s unique institutional framework.  M&R’s 
free-market theory fails to explain these facts.   
K. Regulators Turning a Blind Eye Made Evergreening Feasible 
The Japanese government’s forbearance policy was carried out by 
regulators who turned a blind eye to evergreening—allowing evergreening 
banks to avoid free-market pressures.195  Throughout the lost decade, 
regulators misclassified loans as sound when they were clearly troubled and 
non-performing.  This allowed banks to continue evergreening by 
understating their nonperforming loans and to avoid making adequate loan 
loss provisions, which artificially inflated regulatory capital.196  
                                           
191
  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 16-17. 
192
  An empirical study by Hosono and Sakuragawa finds that as a result of accounting gimmicks that 
were allowed by the government, banks’ “regulatory capital considerably diverged from true economic 
capital.”  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 7.  
193
  Nationalized Once, Nationalized Again?, THE ECONOMIST, July 6, 2002, at 71.  Even Masaru 
Hayami, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, admitted to Parliament that the capital ratios of Japanese banks 
in March 2001 would have been only 7% rather than the reported 11% had they been held to U.S. standards 
of capital adequacy.  Phred Dvorak, Japan’s Banks Face Debate on What Counts as Capital, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 20, 2001, at C1. 
194
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 21-22.  According to Tett: “In the days following 
the collapse [of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank] the government admitted that . . . the bad loans were more 
than twice as large as previously published data.”  Tett, supra note 16, at 105.  
195
  “Aside from a couple of crisis periods when regulators were forced to recognize a few 
insolvencies and temporarily nationalize the offending banks, the banks were surprisingly unconstrained by 
the regulators.”  Caballero et al., supra note 15, at 2. 
196
  Some scholars are of the view that the government miscalculated the cost of its forbearance policy 
and that after it realized its mistake following the severe banking problems in the late 1990s, it changed its 
course, resulting in regulators more closely scrutinizing the banks in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  For 
example, Peeks and Rosengren suggest that in the early 2000s the FSA may have been stricter with forcing 
banks to properly classify loans—although they still did not force any banks below the RBC ratio 
(suggesting that the FSA may still be allowing forbearance to some extent).  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 
11, at 1165 n.16.  See also Sekine et al., supra note 16, at 83. 
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The lost decade is rife with evidence of regulatory blindness.197  A 
study by the Nikkei newspaper found that nearly seventy-five percent of 
loans to Japanese firms that declared bankruptcy in 2000 had been classified 
as sound or merely in need of monitoring.198  Similarly, the put options 
granted to Shinsei and Azzora associated with the purchase of supposedly 
cleaned-up banks were awarded to the buyers of the failed banks because the 
government prevented the bidders from inspecting the banks’ books.  The 
government’s idiosyncratic bidding system was created because it feared that 
if bidders could inspect the banks’ books, evergreening would be exposed 
and other banks evergreening the same underperforming borrowers would be 
forced to come clean.199   
The complicity of regulators with evergreening banks curbed the 
ability of market forces to discipline Japan’s bank managers.  In this way, the 
government's political concerns altered the result that would have been 
achieved in M&R’s utopian Japanese free market. 200  This allowed bank 
evergreening to continue on a massive scale for over a decade despite its 
negative impact on banks’ profitability and the economy as a whole. 
L. Government Insurance Buffered Evergreening Banks from Free 
Market Forces 
Another mechanism the government used to allow banks to continue 
evergreening was to ensure banks that they would not fail and to guarantee 
bank deposits.  Until the late 1990s, it was widely accepted that the Japanese 
government would not let banks fail, especially large banks.201  This allowed 
bank managers to continue to engage in evergreening with the assurance that 
if the Ponzi scheme eventually did collapse, the government would be there 
to catch them.202 
In the late 1990s, when it appeared that some market discipline might 
come to bear on evergreening banks— as the “no-fail policy” was threatened 
by the collapse of  Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (and Sanyo and Yamaichi in 
                                           
197
  Hoshi and Kashyap note that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, “every time a bank has failed, the 
losses uncovered are substantially above those expected based on the most-recent regulatory review.”  
Hoshi & Kashyap (2004b), supra note 101, at 19. 
198
  Mere Fiddling, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 2001, at 69. 
199
  Reborn, Remade, Resold, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004, at 64. 
200
  “The political concerns associated with having to deal with the official recognition that the 
banking system was severely undercapitalized and the consequences of banks severely limiting credit to 
troubled firms provided bank supervisors with the incentive to continue their forbearance policies toward 
banks.”  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 11, at 1165. 
201
  This became known as the government’s “too big to fail policy.” 
202
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, at 6. 
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the securities industry)— the government reformed the Deposit Insurance 
Act.  In 1996, the Act was amended, lifting the existing ten million yen limit 
on deposit insurance so that all deposits were covered.  The limit was 
supposed to be reintroduced on April 1, 2001 but was postponed until April 
1, 2002.  Non-interest bearing loans remained fully protected until April 1, 
2005.203  This allowed banks to continue to attract cheap capital in the form 
of deposit accounts, while engaging in inefficient profit reducing behaviors 
such as evergreening.204   
M. When All Else Failed, Taxpayers’ Money was Used to Help Banks 
Evergreen  
When all else failed, the government simply pumped taxpayers’ 
money into the banks so that they could use it to evergreen.205  By some 
accounts, in 1998 and 1999, almost one half of the public funds injected into 
the banking system were passed on to troubled construction companies in 
the form of debt forgiveness.206  
The government did not merely turn a blind eye to mass evergreening 
with taxpayers’ funds—it pressured banks to do it. The FSA mounted severe 
pressure on foreign owned Shinsei Bank (widely regarded as the only bank 
in Japan that has seriously applied credit risk analysis in its lending 
decisions) to continue lending to severely troubled firms.207  Specifically, 
when Shinsei Bank was deemed to be “behaving improperly” by pulling 
loans from troubled firms, the FSA warned Shinsei that it was government 
policy for banks to support category two208 (deeply troubled but operating) 
firms regardless of how risky they might be.209  Category two firms, which 
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  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004b), supra note 101, at 19. 
204
  According to Hoshi and Kashyap, "by repeatedly delaying the reform of the deposit insurance to 
limit its coverage, the government allowed even the worst banks to continue to attract financing and 
support their insolvent borrowers."  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004a), supra note 9, at 9.  In another paper, Hoshi 
and Kashyap further conclude that by guaranteeing bank deposits the government effectively allowed banks 
to continue evergreening, which prevented unemployment from rising.  However, in their opinion, this was 
a very inefficient mechanism for the government to sustain employment.  Hoshi & Kashyap (2004b), supra 
note 101, at 19. 
205
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 28-29. 
206
  Gillian Tett & David Ibison, Tokyo May Have to Support Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 14, 
2001, at 3. 
207
 For a detailed overview of this case, see Tett, supra note 16, at 227-37. 
208
 Virtually bankrupt or bankrupt firms were labeled “category three” and “category four” firms, 
respectively. 
209
  Tett, supra note 16, at 233-37.  Soji Mori, the FSA commissioner, is quoted as saying, “Shinsei 
should behave in line with other Japanese banks,”  Jason Singer & Phred Dvorak, Shinsei Bank Pressured 
to Keep Shaky Loans, The Wall St. J., September 26, 2001, at C1. 
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have come to be known as “zombies,” were typically firms kept alive by 
evergreening and accounted for the bulk of Japan’s NPLs.210  
When the government could not pump taxpayers’ money into 
evergreening banks directly, it did so indirectly.  Since 1990, when the MOF 
changed its regulations to allow banks to issue subordinated debts to raise 
their capital ratios, the government subsidized banks by purchasing 
subordinate debt at below-market levels.211  Subordinate debt, if fairly priced 
in the market, can act as a disciplining mechanism on unprofitable banks.  
However, subordinate debt was not fairly priced to reflect banks’ default 
risk, as the purchasers were most often associated life insurance companies 
and the government, who never sold the debt in the market.212  The 
government often repaid subordinated debt holders on behalf of insolvent 
banks, thereby removing risk-based pricing from the market.213  These 
observations suggest that subordinate debt did not play any disciplinary role 
but was used as another mechanism to allow evergreening to continue.214  
The government’s direct and indirect use of taxpayers’ money to fund 
evergreening turned what started out as a bank-based Ponzi scheme into a 
national Ponzi scheme.  It dragged out the recession for over a decade. In the 
process, the government accumulated unfathomable deficits unmatched by 
any other OECD country.215  M&R’s free-market theory would have 
predicted none of this. 
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  Tett, supra note 16, at 234.  
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  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 8; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, 
at 15. 
212
  Hosono & Sakuragawa (2005), supra note 11, at 8; Hosono & Sakuragawa (2003), supra note 16, 
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 In fact, since 1995, creditors of subordinate debt of failed banks have been protected by the 
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 By the end of 2002, Japan’s debt to GDP ratio had risen to over 140% and its credit rating was 
downgraded to the same level as Botswana.  Tett, supra note 16, at xvi-xvii, xxiv.  As the decade moved 
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note 9, at 16-18. 
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N. Empirical Evidence Confirms That the Institutional Framework 
Drives Evergreening 
As if all of the aforementioned evidence is not enough, there is now 
empirical evidence that directly supports the hypothesis that evergreening is 
driven by Japan’s unique institutional framework.  Hosono and Sakuragawa, 
in their recent paper, examine the relationship between the government 
allowing the use of accounting gimmicks to artificially inflate regulatory 
capital (which they call “accounting discretion”) and evergreening.216  Based 
on a number of statistically significant results, which demonstrate the 
relationship between accounting discretion and evergreening, they arrive at a 
definitive conclusion:  
Severely capital-constrained Japanese banks, particularly major 
banks, extended bad loans in order to inflate regulatory capital 
under the accounting rule, which allowed banks to hide latent 
loan losses. The government responded to the perverse 
behaviour of banks by allowing the discretionary enforcement 
of minimum capital requirements which softened the banks’ 
capital constraints and contributed to the increase in bad 
loans.217  
Enough already. The point is simple: self-interested bank managers lent to 
loser firms to meet regulatory requirements so that they could keep their 
lifetime employment—not to make banks more profitable.  Self-interested 
Japanese government officials facilitated this behaviour to avoid the political 
repercussions of massive bank and industry failures.  The effect of free-
market forces was de minimus. And now, M&R have to contend with 
empirical evidence that proves it.  
O. The Main Bank System Shaped Evergreening in the Lost Decade  
As powerful as Japan’s government was, the main bank system also 
played an indispensable role in driving banks to evergreen.  In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that without the main bank system in place the 
government’s ability to persuade banks to evergreen would have been 
extremely limited.218  The main bank system, developed following the war, 
was the most important factor in determining which banks evergreened and 
to whom. 
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From the perspective of the conventional main bank theory, 
evergreening makes perfect sense—it is merely conventional rescue theory 
gone bad.  As explained in section two above, rescue theory is based on the 
premise that banks promise to rescue because the institutional framework 
provided the necessary incentives to make rescuing in the best interest of 
banks.  As the theory goes, in the high growth era, the government provided 
an optimal level of incentives to drive banks to an efficient equilibrium 
where they only rescued potentially productive firms.  
Similarly, in the lost decade, the institutional framework created by 
the government (and not free-market forces) drove “rescue” behaviour.  
However, the incentives provided by the government were not to rescue only 
potentially productive firms but, perversely, to rescue habitually 
unproductive firms to achieve a political agenda.  In other words, the same 
mechanism that drove efficient rescue ultimately drove evergreening—the 
only difference was the level of incentives provided by the government to 
rescue were much greater and the agenda was different.   
Peek and Rosengren, in their recent research, conclude that during the 
lost decade the main bank system played an integral role in facilitating 
evergreening.  They find, using a host of empirical measures, that main 
banks were more likely than secondary banks or other lenders to provide 
additional loans to failing firms (i.e. to evergreen) and that this effect was 
even stronger if the firm was in the same keiretsu.219  
Peek and Rosengren’s research also suggests that the government 
specifically encouraged main banks, as opposed to other lenders, to fulfil 
their traditional role as “the rescuer” by evergreening failing firms.  They 
find that government lenders were more likely to increase loans to firms that 
had troubled main banks.  This suggests that the government attempted to 
aid unhealthy main banks that were keeping their promise to evergreen.220  
The only group for which Peek and Rosengren were unable to confirm 
a pattern of evergreening in the lost decade was non-bank lenders that were 
not in the same keiretsu as the borrowing firm.221  This makes perfect sense, 
as these firms were not driven by either government-created incentives 
(which were specifically directed towards banks) or incentives that were 
provided to main banks to rescue failing firms. 
The lost decade is often characterized as an era in which the main 
bank system had a diminished impact on Japanese corporate governance.  In 
fact, the opposite is true.  During the lost decade, in spite of the deregulation 
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of the bond market, Japanese firms relied more on bank financing than they 
did during the bubble years. 222   During this period of increased reliance on 
bank financing, “loser firms” disproportionately increased their reliance on 
main banks when compared with healthy firms.223  The conclusion: as much 
as main banks drove growth in the high growth era, they stifled it in the lost 
decade. 
The theory espoused by M&R appears even more untenable in light of 
the evidence of a link between evergreening and the main bank system.  This 
should not surprise.  It would be astounding for a simple theory based on the 
lone assumption of free-markets to explain the complex interaction between 
Japan’s unique institutional framework (i.e. its matrix of laws, regulations, 
institutions and formal and informal government policies and practices) and 
one of the most complex economies in the world.  Unfortunately, the world 
is not as simple as M&R’s theory suggests.  Moreover, to assume that it is so 
simple leads us to erroneous conclusions. Indeed, according to M&R, “the 
moral is simple: the main bank does not help the least profitable firms.  If 
anything, it avoids them.”224  It would be difficult to construct a less accurate 
description of bank lending in the lost decade. 
V. CONCLUSION:  JAPANESE BANK LENDING IN THE LOST DECADE—
EVIDENCE AGAINST CONVERGENCE 
M&R’s recent research does a magnificent job of breathing new life 
into the Japanese corporate governance debate.  Indeed, these eminent 
scholars have raised questions that challenge the conventional theory of 
Japanese corporate governance that many academics recite as gospel.  
However, M&R have gone too far.  A passage from the concluding chapter 
in their recently published book, The Fable of the Keiretsu, says it all: 
conventional microtheory with profit maximizing firms buying 
and selling in competitive markets does describe Japan. It 
always did. The fables about Japanese bureaucrats, keiretsu, 
main banks, and systematically misgoverned firms are just 
that—fables. At root, the Japanese economy differs little from 
the American economy (or, we suspect, from any economy 
anywhere else). To learn about the Japanese economy one does 
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not need Japan-specific accounts of corporate groups, main 
banks, and government-led growth. One does need 
economics.225 
Although I respect M&R’s scholarly abilities, I am curious as to how they 
will tell the story of main bank rescue in the lost decade without any “Japan-
specific” accounts.  I suspect that the story will not be a non-starter: “that it 
did not exist” and that this author has “created another myth.” 
Miwa and Ramseyer repeatedly suggest that the picture they paint of 
Japan is mundane and boring because it predictably tracks the contours of 
old-fashioned standard economic theory.226  Boring?  Mundane?  I think not. 
If correct, they have uncovered something that has eluded legions of 
venerable scholars—that standard economic theory alone can explain 
Japan’s (or any other country’s) complex system of corporate governance.  
Indeed, their story is an exciting fairytale of perfect markets which droves of 
successful American businesses that have failed to succeed in Japan only 
wish were true.   
Sadly, the prize for boredom must be claimed by this author.  Simply, 
Japanese corporate governance is driven by many different factors including 
laws, regulations, institutions, formal and informal government policies, 
economics, culture, history and a bit of random chance.  This is not a novel 
theory.  Professor Milhaupt suggested it in his brief review of one of M&R’s 
earlier attempts to espouse their logic.  As Milhaupt noted, Douglas North 
received a Nobel Prize years ago for taking a similar approach.227 
As boring or mundane as this conclusion may be, it may pique the 
interest of some scholars engaged in the debate over the convergence of 
corporate governance.228  Banking has become one of the most 
internationally integrated fields in the global economy.  The same general 
law, the Basel Accord, ostensibly governed Japanese banks as it did banks in 
the United States and in other developed countries.  The lost decade was 
marked by deregulation that allowed free-market forces more power than at 
anytime in Japan’s post-war history.  The scenario screams for 
convergence—but the reality was divergence.  
For over a decade, Japanese banks acted in precisely the opposite 
manner than the drafters of the Basel Accord, American precedent, or 
standard economic theory would have predicted.  The result was a unique 
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system that drove the actions of the largest businesses and financial 
institutions in the world’s second largest economy for over a decade.  
Japan’s unique institutional framework and path dependence—not the Basel 
Accord or free-market forces—ruled the day.  Those who fail to consider 
“Japan-specific accounts” are left with only absurd conclusions for how this 
could have occurred. 
A final point must be made with respect to M&R’s use of statistics.  
They remind readers on several occasions of a famous Harvard professor’s 
words.  “‘Know thy data,’ Zvi Grilliches told generations of budding 
Harvard econometricians.  Office-chair theorists would do well to learn a 
little data too.”229  I must agree.  However, perhaps more importantly, 
armchair theorists must know thy theory that underlies thy data—or else thy 
data may be all for naught. 
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